Summary

But still the English came to North America and still government and business leaders supported them. This was not without reason. In the 17th century, Europe was in upheaval and England’s place in it unsure. Moreover, England was going through a period of internal instability that would culminate in the unthinkable — civil war in 1642 and regicide in 1649. England’s colonies were born from this situation, and the colonies of Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay and the little-known colony of Providence Island in the Caribbean were part of a broader Puritan geopolitical strategy to solve England’s problems.

Analysis

Throughout the first half of the 17th century, England was wracked by internal divisions that would lead to civil war in 1642. Religion was a huge part of this. The dispute was over the direction of the Church of England. Some factions favored “high” church practices that involved elaborate ritual. The Puritans, by contrast, wanted to clear the national religion of what they considered Catholic traces. This religious crisis compounded a political crisis at the highest levels of government, pitting Parliament against the monarchy.

By the beginning of the 17th century, England had undergone centralizing reforms that gave the king and his Parliament unrestricted power to make laws. Balance was needed. The king had the power to call Parliament into session and dismiss it. Parliament had the power to grant him vital funds needed for war or to pay down debt. However, Parliament had powerful Puritan factions that sought not only to advance their sectarian cause but also to advance the power of Parliament beyond its constraints. Kings James I and his son Charles I, for their part, sought to gain an unrestrained hold on power that would enable them to make decisive strategic choices abroad. They relied, internally and externally, on Catholics, crypto-Catholics and high church advocates — exacerbating the displeasure of Parliament.

Both kings continually fought with Parliament over funding for the monarchy’s debt and for new ventures. Both dissolved Parliament several times; Charles ultimately did so for a full 11 years beginning in 1629.

Spain was England’s major strategic problem on the Continent. Protestant England saw itself as under constant threat from the Catholic powers in Europe. This led to problems when the people came to see their leaders, James I and his son Charles, as insufficiently hostile to Spain and insufficiently committed to the Protestant cause on the Continent. In order to stop mounting debt, shortly after taking power James made the unpopular move of ending a war with Spain that England had been waging alongside the Netherlands since 1585. In 1618, the Thirty Years’ War broke out in the German states — a war that, in part, pitted Protestants against Catholics and spread throughout Central Europe. James did not wish to become involved in the war. In 1620, the Catholic Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II, a relative of Spain’s King Philip III, pushed Frederick V, the Protestant son-in-law of England’s King James, out of his lands in Bohemia, and Spain attacked Frederick in his other lands in the Rhineland. The English monarchy called for a defense of Frederick but was unwilling to commit to significant military action to aid him.

Puritan factions in Parliament, however, wanted England to strike at Spain directly by attacking Spanish shipments from the Americas, which could have paid for itself in captured goods. To make matters worse, from 1614 to 1623, James I pursued an unpopular plan to marry his son Charles to the Catholic daughter of Philip III of Spain — a plan called the “Spanish Match.” Instead, Charles I ended up marrying the Catholic daughter of the king of France in 1625. This contributed to the impression that James and Charles were too friendly with Spain and Catholicism, or even were secret Catholics. Many Puritans and other zealous promoters of the Protestant cause began to feel that they had to look outside of the English government to further their cause.

Amid this complex constellation of Continental powers and England’s own internal incoherence, a group of Puritan leaders in Parliament, who would later play a pivotal role in the English Civil War, focused on the geopolitical factors that were troubling England. Issues of finance and Spanish power were at the core. A group of them struck on the idea of establishing a set of Puritan colonial ventures in the Americas that would simultaneously serve to unseat Spain from her colonial empire and enrich England, tipping the geopolitical balance. In this they were continuing Elizabeth I’s strategy of 1585, when she started a privateer war in the Atlantic and Caribbean to capture Spanish treasure ships bound from the Americas. Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay were part of this early vision, but they were both far too remote to challenge the Spanish, and the group believed that the area’s climate precluded it from being a source of vast wealth from cash crops. New England, however, was safe from Spanish aggression and could serve as a suitable starting point for a colonial push into the heart of Spanish territory.

The Effects of Spanish Colonization

Spain’s 1492 voyage to the Americas and subsequent colonization had changed Europe indelibly by the 17th century. It had complicated each nation’s efforts to achieve a favorable balance of power. As the vanguard of settlement in the New World, Spain and Portugal were the clear winners. From their mines, especially the Spanish silver mine in Potosi, American precious metals began to flow into their government coffers in significant amounts beginning in 1520, with a major uptick after 1550. Traditionally a resource-poor and fragmented nation, Spain now had a reliable revenue source to pursue its global ambitions.

Despite having no successful colonies until the beginning of the 17th century, England did see some major benefits from the discovery of the Americas. The addition of the Western Atlantic to Europe’s map and the influx of trade goods from that direction fundamentally altered trade routes in Europe, shifting them from their previous intense focus on the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean to encompass an ocean on which England held a unique strategic position. The nearby Netherlands — recently free from Spain — enjoyed a similar position and, along with England, took a major new role in shipping. By the middle of the 17th century, the Dutch had a merchant fleet as large as all others combined in Europe and were competing for lands in the New World. Sweden, another major European naval power, also held a few possessions in North America and the Caribbean. (This led to curious events such as “New Sweden,” a colony located along the Delaware River, falling under Dutch control in the 1650s and becoming part of the “New Netherlands.”)

England’s Drive Into the New World

In spite of its gains in maritime commerce, England was still far behind Spain and Portugal in the Americas. The Iberian nations had established a strong hold on South America, Central America and the southern portions of North America, including the Caribbean. Much of North America, however, remained relatively untouched. It did not possess the proven mineral wealth of the south but it had a wealth of natural capital — fisheries, timber, furs and expanses of fertile soil.

However, much of the population of the Americas was in a band in central Mexico, meaning that the vast pools of labor available to the Spanish and Portuguese were not present elsewhere in North America. Instead, England and other colonial powers would need to bring their own labor. They were at a demographic advantage in this regard. Since the 16th century, the Continent’s population had exploded. The British Isles and Northwest Europe grew the most, with England expanding from 2.6 million in 1500 to around 5.6 million by 1650. By contrast, the eastern woodlands of North America in 1600 had around 200,000 inhabitants — the population of London. Recent catastrophic epidemics brought by seasonal European fishermen and traders further decimated the population, especially that of New England. The disaster directly benefited Plymouth, which was built on the site of the deserted town of Patuxet and used native cleared and cultivated land.

After its founding in 1620, Plymouth was alone in New England for a decade and struggled to become profitable. It was the first foothold, however, for a great Puritan push into the region. In time, this push would subsume the tiny separatist colony within the larger sphere of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. This new colony’s numbers were much higher: The first wave in 1630 brought 700 English settlers to Salem, and by 1640 there were 11,000 living in the region.

Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay were different from nearby Virginia. Virginia was initially solely a business venture, and its colonists provided the manpower. New England, by contrast, was a settler society of families from the start. Both Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay were started by English Puritans — Christian sectarians critical of the state-run Church of England. Plymouth’s settlers were Puritan separatists who wanted no connection to England. Massachusetts Bay’s colonists were non-separatist Puritans who believed in reforming the church. For both, creating polities in North America furthered their sectarian political goals. The pilgrims wanted to establish a separate godly society to escape persecution; the Puritans of Salem wanted to establish a beacon that would serve to change England by example. Less known, however, is that the financial backers of the New England colonies had a more ambitious goal of which New England was only the initial phase.

In this plan, Massachusetts was to provide profit to its investors, but it was also to serve as a way station from which they could then send settlers to a small colony they simultaneously founded on Providence Island off the Miskito Coast of modern Nicaragua. This island, now part of Colombia, was in the heart of the Spanish Caribbean and was meant to alter the geopolitics of Central America and bring it under English control. It was in this way that they hoped to solve England’s geostrategic problems on the Continent and advance their own political agenda.

Providence was an uninhabited island in an area where the Spanish had not established deep roots. The island was a natural fortress, with a coral reef that made approach difficult and high, craggy rocks that helped in defense. It also had sheltered harbors and pockets of fertile land that could be used for production of food and cash crops.

It would serve, in their mind, as the perfect first foothold for England in the lucrative tropical regions of the Americas, from which it could trade with nearby native polities. In the short run, Providence was a base of operations, but in the long run it was to be a launchpad for an ambitious project to unseat Spain in the Americas and take Central America for England. In keeping with Puritan ideals, Providence was to be the same sort of “godly” society as Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth, just a more profitable one. Providence Island would enable the English to harry Spanish ships, bring in profit to end disputes with the crown and bolster the Protestant position in the Thirty Years’ War.

But while Massachusetts Bay would succeed, Providence would fail utterly. Both Massachusetts Bay and Providence Island received their first shipment of Puritan settlers in 1630. Providence was expected to yield immense profits, while Massachusetts was expected to be a tougher venture. Both were difficult, but Providence’s constraints proved fatal. The island did not establish a cash crop economy and its attempts to trade with native groups on the mainland were not fruitful.

The island’s geopolitical position in Spanish military territory meant that it needed to obsessively focus on security. This proved its downfall. After numerous attacks and several successful raids on Spanish trade on the coast, the investors decided in 1641 to initiate plans to move colonists down from Massachusetts Bay to Providence. Spanish forces received intelligence of this plan and took the island with a massive force, ending England’s control.

Puritan Legacies

The 1641 invasion ended English settlement on the island, which subsequently became a Spanish military depot. The Puritans left little legacy there. New England, however, flourished. It became, in time, the nearest replica of English political life outside of the British Isles and a key regional component of the Thirteen Colonies and, later, the United States. It was the center of an agricultural order based on individual farmers and families and later of the United States’ early manufacturing power. England sorted out its internal turmoil not by altering its geopolitical position externally — a project that faced serious resource and geographical constraints — but through massive internal upheaval during the English Civil War.

The celebration of the fruits of the Plymouth Colony’s brutal first year is the byproduct of England’s struggle against Spain on the Continent and in the New World. Thus, the most celebrated meal in America comes with a side of geopolitics.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was in Brussels on Tuesday with an ambitious agenda: to promote the establishment of a “safe zone” in northern Syria. Erdogan can see that the Europeans have no good solutions to their immigration crisis other than to manipulate the route and flow of migrants. The latest idea gaining traction in a host of European capitals is to keep the hundreds of thousands of people trying to cross the Mediterranean off of Europe’s shores by bottling them up closer to home instead. Brussels would, of course, pay Ankara to take care of its problem by housing more refugees traveling overland. But Turkey, which already hosts more than 2.5 million Syrians and has spent $7.6 billion on the refugee crisis so far, isn’t buying into Europe’s offer. Erdogan wants more. Much more.

Now that Turkey has Europe’s attention and Russia has blindsided the United States in Syria, Erdogan is attempting to use the chaotic climate to dust off his plans for a Syrian safe zone. The Turkish version of a safe zone entails reinforcing rebel forces that are friendly with Turkey to flush out the Islamic State from a zone measuring 80 kilometers (50 miles) by 40 kilometers in Syria’s northern Aleppo province. A no-fly zone, according to the Turkish proposal, would accompany the safe zone. Once the zone is declared safe and free of terrorist activity, refugee camps would be set up and Syrian migrants could live within their country’s borders again.

There is also a broader objective framing Turkey’s strategy. A divided Syria undoubtedly creates risk, but it also presents an opportunity for Turkey to expand its sphere of influence in the Levant. This is the main driver behind Turkey’s campaign to topple Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s government and replace it with a Sunni Islamist-led administration that takes its cues from Ankara. After all, someone would have to provide security to make the zone in northern Syria “safe”; Turkish forces and civilian personnel presumably would take the lead in reinforcing such a corridor, potentially placing Turkish boots back on Arab soil.

Meanwhile, there is a murkier motive to consider. Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party will enter the Nov. 2 elections with a low chance of winning enough votes to regain its majority in parliament. The likelihood of the elections resulting in another hung parliament, coupled with Erdogan’s reluctance to share power, raises the potential (albeit in an extreme scenario) for Turkey to use the premise of a military operation in Syria to stave off a third round of elections.

But Russia is botching Turkey’s plans. Russia, Turkey and NATO are still arguing over whether two alleged Russian violations of Turkish airspace near the Syrian border were intentional (as Turkey and NATO claim) or accidental (as Russia insists they were). Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov said Tuesday that Russia was ready to form a working group and that it would be pleased to host Turkish Defense Ministry officials in Moscow to avoid further misunderstandings in Syria. Ankara has no choice but to interpret Russia’s actions as a signal that Moscow is willing to interfere in a Turkish-led safe zone if Ankara tries to push ahead with its plans.

Moscow’s strategy has already begun to bear fruit. The European officials who met with Erdogan in Brussels listened politely to his ideas for a safe zone and promised to discuss the idea further. But no European power wants to risk getting mixed up with a brazen Russia on the Syrian battlefield. The Europeans would rather bargain with Erdogan on issues such as visa liberalization for Turkish citizens and Turkey’s acceptance of more migrants on the Continent’s behalf instead.

The United States has kept Turkey’s safe zone plan at arm’s length for similar reasons. However, Russia’s military adventurism in Syria is accelerating U.S. plans for a rebel offensive that could still at least partially fit with Turkey’s interests.

In the coming months, the United States will be focused on the areas east and west of the Euphrates River. To the east, the United States will ramp up its support for Kurdish forces and their allies in preparation for a move toward Raqqa against the Islamic State. Greater U.S. support for Kurdish forces will not please Turkish leaders, but the United States’ simultaneous boost in aid for the rebels Turkey has been preparing to the west will. Here, the United States and Turkey will work together to try to carve out a border zone free of the Islamic State’s presence. The Americans are avoiding the label of a safe zone to keep the operation from conflating with Turkey’s more ambitious agenda. Nonetheless, the United States will be indirectly taking the first crucial steps toward Turkey’s ultimate goals for northern Syria.

Of course, Turkey will still have to contend with Russia. Moscow will do whatever it can to play off the fears of the NATO alliance. If a buffer zone were established in Syria and if Turkey, a NATO member, tried to protect the airspace over the zone, who would shoot down the Russian air force in the event that it crossed into the zone? In Brussels, Erdogan reiterated that “an attack on Turkey means an attack on NATO.” But if NATO proves too afraid of the consequences of responding to Russian interference, then NATO’s credibility will have been dealt a major blow. And that is exactly the outcome the Russians are hoping for.

Summary

France’s intervention in Mali, supported by other Western states and a large African force, is winding down. Most offensive operations have ended, and French forces have begun withdrawing. Now the achievements of the operation and the remaining challenges are becoming clear. Although the intervention has succeeded in denying jihadists territorial control over northern Mali, it could not contain such forces, which have dispersed throughout the Sahel region. While French operations degraded the militancy, the wider jihadist threat in the region persists due to the lack of capabilities and cooperation among the countries of the Sahel.

Analysis

France launched its military intervention in Mali on Jan. 11 in response to the actions of jihadist militants in the north of the country. In 2012, West African countries, along with France, Germany and the United States, had attempted to set up an African-led intervention with Western support after jihadist militants established a presence in northern Mali. The objective of the proposed mission, and subsequently of the French intervention, was to deny sanctuary in the country to the jihadists.

The French hoped to mitigate the threats emanating from a militant sanctuary that had been established when jihadists exploited an existing conflict between Tuareg factions and the Malian government in Bamako. The issue was not necessarily Mali’s territorial integrity, but rather regional stability and economic interests across the Sahel, including French oil and natural gas projects in southern Algeria and uranium mining in Niger.

Achievements of the Intervention

While the intervention in Mali could be seen as a success, the wider region remains unstable. The French campaign, known as Operation Serval, denied sanctuary to jihadist forces in northern Mali but it did not destroy the militant organizations. The operation’s inability to fully contain the jihadist elements within Mali allowed militants to disperse into several other countries across the region. Jihadists are still present and capable of operating throughout the Sahel, and they could be augmented by fighters fleeing Mali.

In Mali, French and allied forces have degraded jihadist forces so that they are no longer able to control territory in the country. French forces eliminated a threat against central and southern Mali, and the militants are no longer capable of conducting the conventional operations needed for territorial control in northern parts of the country. However, the remaining militants still can launch insurgency-style attacks.

Throughout the intervention, the French offensive operations went largely unanswered because of the firepower France was able to project and the huge imbalance resulting from the militants’ lack of military sophistication. The cost of the operation, which involved some 4,000 troops over three and a half months, reportedly reached 205 million euros ($264 million) by April 25 — a relatively high amount considering the French military’s budgetary constraints due to huge spending reductions across Europe and the expense of a long-term presence in Mali.

Roughly 91 million euros of the operation’s budget were allocated for transporting French forces and equipment. The airlift operations into Mali highlighted one of the shortcomings of the French military, which required support from several Western nations to move the necessary troops and equipment into staging areas in Mali. The United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, Canada, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium all contributed military transport aircraft in support of the French mobilization. France also depended on the United States for aerial refueling during long-range French sorties departing from Chad, as well as intelligence gathering through U.S. drone coverage.

Operations inside Mali also were not the work of the French alone. France cooperated closely with African forces, the contingent of which eventually grew to 6,000 troops. Chadian forces played the most active role in the offensive phase of the intervention, especially in fighting in the Tigharghar Mountains. Chad has now initiated a progressive withdrawal from Mali, and only half of its contingent remains in the Kidal region, though the Chadian government has said it would redeploy its troops once the intervention becomes a U.N. operation involving 12,000 foreign troops on July 1. Meanwhile, forces from other African states are taking the leading role in Mali as French troops withdraw, and securing Mali’s population centers is becoming an African responsibility.

The Aftermath

Although France is wrapping up its most active operations in Mali, security threats remain in northern Mali and throughout the Sahel. Jihadist elements continue to stage attacks in Mali, and the dispersal of militants to other countries in the region has drawn attention to the cross-border jihadist threat, which will be more difficult to combat. Algeria, Tunisia and Libya have preexisting militant threats that could be augmented by fighters fleeing Mali. This problem will persist until all countries of the Sahel become capable of dealing with these security issues and begin concerted actions against the persistent jihadist threat, but internal constraints in these countries will limit regional collaboration.

Nevertheless, while militants have remained in northern Mali, the conditions under which the jihadists were able to gather such strength in northern Mali — the collapse of the Libyan regime and the resulting flow of weapons to several militant factions — are unlikely to be replicated anytime soon. Moreover, the permanent deployment of 1,000 French troops in Mali, along with a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle base in Niger, will limit the threat posed to the north.

After the jihadist threat in northern Mali was reduced, reports emerged from across the Sahel region indicating that fleeing jihadists had not been contained within Mali. Tunisian security forces are combating militants, including elements that had been involved in fighting in Mali, and other jihadists previously active in Mali have announced the establishment of a new organization in Algeria. Reports of fighters coming from the ranks of Malian jihadists have also come from northern Nigeria, where Boko Haram is active, and from as far away as Chad and Sudan’s Darfur region. Perhaps the most worrisome presence of fleeing Malian militants from Mali is in Libya. It has been suggested that most of the jihadists that have left Mali have settled in southern Libya, a country already facing a struggle against militants and where a power vacuum could allow elements from Mali to reorganize, re-supply and plan new operations.

The risk in the greater Sahel region resulting from the French intervention is not limited to the dispersal of militants. French and other Western interests have been targeted several times since the beginning of Operation Serval. The continuation of such a threat will force France and other Western states to expend more resources to secure their assets and interests throughout the Sahel. The threat of attacks at home in France, whether by “lone wolf” terrorists or by established militant networks, has also increased. The presence of French citizens among the jihadists in northern Mali has added to France’s concerns about such attacks — fears that date back to the 1990s, when al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s predecessors conducted attacks in France.

In northern Mali, a lower level militant threat is unlikely to disappear soon. Bombing attacks targeting Malian and African forces have occurred throughout the area. The initial style of attacks that militants conducted after the intervention began — using gunmen in population centers such as Gao and Timbuktu to draw security forces into prolonged firefights — was successful, but it might have been too manpower-intensive to continue. The jihadists gradually changed their tactics to focus on bombings, but these have proved less successful.

African forces, which man the first line of checkpoints and defenses outside population centers, have been trained by French forces on procedures to deal with these threats and appear to have followed, so far, French instruction. The ability to mitigate the effects of bomb attacks through proper security checkpoints and search procedures, which have allowed few casualties and little material damage, could compel militants to modify their tactics — possibly using small arms attacks to draw in security forces before using suicide bombers, as militants in Afghanistan and Somalia have done. The limited damage caused by the bombings could also push jihadists to improve their bombmaking techniques.

The security threat from jihadist militancy in the wider Sahel region, which predates the French operations in Mali, will continue. These militants could be strengthened by jihadist elements leaving northern Mali under pressure of the French offensive, and they could seek to exploit the limits of security operations and regional cooperation as they plan further attacks. A repeat of the threat posed in northern Mali is highly unlikely, but power vacuums such as the one in southern Libya could lead to new concentrations of jihadist activity.

Spanish Elections are making their appearance in the near horizon. This year, the Spanish people might be faced to meaningful unexpected and never-seen-before outcomes. This year has given place to the rise of new players in the political game and to modern creative and alternative parties to the mostly traditional bi-party p  olitical scenario that characterized the Spanish government until present—the Popular Party (PP) and the Socialist Labor Party (PSOE).

We refer here to the two new popular parties who have recently made their ways towards a more significant presence in the Medias, a closer connection to the public, the issuing of new promising promises and a rise amongst the conservative parties in Spain, highlighted throughout the polls ahead of the mid-December elections.

These are the CIUDADANOS and the PODEMOS parties, two young ideologies lead by ambitious figures—Albert Rivera and Pablo Iglesias respectively—ready to come to the front and, if not becoming Spain’s leaders, at least catching a piece of the cake that is being raffled amongst the candidates of the new coalition government to be formed in December.

See Polls made by EL MUNDO journal – Elecciones Generales – Sondeos

What is it that has given the two the opportunity to stand out in the last year?

Being each party differently placed in the political spectrum, the one in the center-right and the second to the left, the most highlighted aspect to be noticed is the name given to these two parties. Indeed, as much as the traditional PP and PSOE possess titles that make reference to the society, these two new parties have rather chosen a more quotidian name to make such a reference, a title accessible to all’s understanding, a simple name that represents nothing but a new, fresh, popular character. The name CIUDADANOS means citizens, a common word that attracts everyone who holds a Spanish passport and feels a Spanish national. This gives a feeling of belonging, I am a citizen, and therefore I belong, or, Spain for the Spanish people. The name PODEMOS is more of a “yes, we can” kind of name, which appeals to the slogan of positivism within a lake of problems that Spain currently counters. Just as the American crisis required a motivating slogan in 2008, the European crisis does to. PODEMOS refers to entrepreneurship, initiatives, the saving light after the tunnel, an alternative, motivation, and many more positive adjectives that the Spanish public is so much in need of at the moment.

Although the name of a party might only seem like a title to give to it, something catchy and with a good sound, in fact it is rather the reflection of the party’s principles, bases, ideas, and is meant to give a hint on what is to be expected from its ideology. In these cases, the parties’ names indeed point to two ideologies which propose quite new and popular ideas, different from the old ones, the ones that have been around ever since the Spanish democracy came along in 1977. When a country finds itself drowned in a number of problems, and when the leading figures don’t seem to be able to avoid the boat from sinking, the people start showing an interest for new solutions to the same problems. These two parties have come along recently in light of the current political, economic and social situation in Spain. The political situations is reflected through the numerous cases of corruption emerging mostly at the provincial and municipal level, the economic refers to the obvious Euro crisis that has been going on for the past seven years and which has affected a high portion of the population, creating more than a 25% of unemployment, and the social aspect is connected to the previous one, which has brought about a significant rate of young people leaving the country seeking for jobs abroad, and therefore creating an important brain drain in the country. In a moment in which the Spanish people find themselves at a desperate moment, and see no positive results coming from the government’s repetitive promises, they claim the need to find solid alternatives. And for it, CIUDADANOS and PODEMOS have appeared with “saving solutions” and “promising results”. They have approached society and reached their hurt feelings to propose the most attractive measures to be taken at the political level. They have created a, maybe placebo, medicine to cure all the country’s problems. One might ask, how come they have such a simple spectrum of solutions, and how come they can promise to apply them, while the current government hasn’t been as smart to find these first? Probably the emotional part is the one that plays a central role amongst the Spanish people at the moment, to the point that it overshadows the logical thinking. These parties have ridiculed the traditional parties, presenting them as incapable of managing the situation, and as lacking control of the panorama.

This has given them the opportunity of offering an alternative to the existing ideologies and political parties. This is the fourth aspect that has allowed these parties to stand out in the political scenario of Spain. That is, CIUDADANOS and PODEMOS are putting out there a clear alternative, avoiding vague policies and expressing a solid base of principles. For example, adapting taxes to the citizen’s revenues which would alleviate the weight on the middle classes, the most affected one by the crisis, request for government workers to declare their assets and monthly payments with public money before, during and after they take their post in order to block the possibility of corruption, making government meetings open to the public in order to increase transparency, including a mailbox to receive anonymous denouncing of corruption cases, the banning of corrupted leaders in their party lists, stopping the government’s plans for privatization of the health system, in education promises on making kindergarten and text books for school free, promises on stopping evictions of debtors with ‘good faith’ with no alternative housing, establishment of a rescue plan to ensure the supply of water, electricity and gas for people in difficult economic situations.

Spain is seeing a repetition of history. Desperate periods have repeatedly requested desperate solutions; often when a country has seen itself in a long-time trouble it has always needed renovated ideas and fresh leading figures to take over the government. This has been the case of the raise of fascism in the aftermath of fist world war, Soviet Lenin after the Bolshevicks revolution, Nasser’s victory in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and later the different governments that derived from the Arab Spring, more recently, the rise of Syriza in Greece, amongst many more examples.

The analysis to be made for these elections should be that old traditional parties have a life-time experience in the political game, with the legal apparatus, and socio-economic constraints, as opposed to the newly created parties, while the young parties might be able to propose new creative ways of working around the country’s obstacles and challenges and might provide the people with new hopes. As of now CIUDADANOS and PODEMOS have gained ground, although they still remain less popular than the two traditional big parties PP and PSOE. This might only mean that new players will gain weight in a possible coalition.

Aidan Borkan is a young and promising political analyst. He is specialized in the changing political landscapes of the US and the Middle East. He is currently a student from a top American University. He is currently serving as a political Analyst for a prestigious American Candidate to The White House.

As the new presidential election cycle comes into spin, the same forces behind foreign policy agendas – the American elite – are revving their engines and preparing to spend enormous sums to bring their favorite candidates to power. A small country of 8.4 million, the State of Israel has emerged as a political asset among the central issues for candidates to address to swing donors and key voting blocs.

In the first Republican debate, Israel is second only to Iran in numbers for countries mentioned. That is no coincidence. The Democratic voter base is becoming alienated by an Israeli government led by a right-wing conservative coalition of hawkish ministers, with 47% describing the Jewish State as “Racist” and only 48% who believe Israel sincerely desires peace according to a poll by political consultant Frank Luntz.

These figures appear unnoticed by the Democratic mega-donors’ favorite, who has taken a hardline stance toward a commitment to the future and security of the state. In a personally addressed letter to Haim Saban, Hillary Clinton allayed her opposition to BDS initiatives and will play the ‘Israel’s security first’ card against a house that is deeply divided. 

There are two major Democratic candidates that have openly expressed their criticism of Israel’s policies – Martin O’Malley and Bernie Sanders – though their chances of electoral success depend on a grassroots level support, while Clinton courts billionaires to the likes of Haim Saban and George Soros. Senator Sander’s opposition to Israel’s reaction in Operation Protective Edge resonates with progressive voters and is directly in-line with his refusal to bow to the Billionaire class and its interests. As the divisions deepen between pro and anti-Israel constituencies, no candidate will make it to the White House before addressing how they will change the relationship with Jerusalem. Israel’s very image as America’s top ally in the region is suffering numerous blows, from the backlash of a failed attempt by of Prime Minister Netanyahu to sway elected officials against their president on the Iranian Nuclear Accord, and the brash and confrontational stance the leading coalition has taken against advancing the prospects for peace – namely the expansionof settlements at a time of dimming hope for renewed talks with a weakened Palestinian Authority. Dissent is growing, even within the Pro-Israel community.

Self-identified Jews and Zionists are expressing their discomfort with an administration that does not represent their values in major forums. The once solid base which held the US-Israel relationship as sacrosanct is beginning to fracture, as major donor-backed candidates tow the same line as decadesbefore and struggle with outreach to young and progressive voters. Republican candidates – with the sole exception of Rand Paul – are strengthening their hardline positions on Israel’s security in a shallow attempt to court Evangelist and conservative Jewish votes. Open sympathy towards the settlement movement and a break from traditional bipartisan opposition to a cause that is near universally seen as undemocratic, can be seen in the form of campaign stops in Shiloh by Mike Huckabee and the flow of US dollars through shadowy conservative organizations. The very idea of referring to the West Bank and Gaza as occupied territories, as did Chris Christie, has come under fire by Sheldon Adelson, whose view of a greater Israel which encompases all post-1967 geography without 4.4 million of its demography, will dictate the Republican stance.

The right-wing GOP has grown its influence in the major Israel lobby, AIPAC, and made inroads through the Orthodox-Jewish establishment, but further distanced itself from the majority of US Jewry and as the events of this summer prove – is incapable of driving a wedge between a solidly Democratic majority of Jewish voters. To the dismay of Adelson, the love of Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state is greater in America than is the desire for ethnic supremacy – one of the principals which the foundation of Israel was to fight against. The state will survive this election cycle, but the Netanyahu government ought to open its eyes towards the sway of the nation away from a traditional alliance, from the college campus and eventually to capitol hill.

Summary

China’s already formidable military may be about to get an overhaul. With Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly set to unveil what the media is calling the most sweeping set of military reforms since the mid-1980s, one of the most powerful forces in the world may get a reshuffling that makes it more flexible and effective. The reforms will be officially announced in the wake of a Sept. 3 military parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. One potential plan leaked to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post offers some insight into Beijing’s intentions. Though the final reforms will likely be more conservative, the leaked proposal suggests China is generally aiming to centralize command, increase cooperation between services and look beyond hard geographic boundaries. In the end, China may be successful at improving its military effectiveness, but its reforms will fall short of loosening the Communist Party’s tight grip over the country’s armed forces.

Analysis

According to the South China Morning Post, it was several “reform-minded officers” who leaked a version of the reform plan to the media. The leaked proposal includes large personnel cuts and several structural changes. First, the seven existing military regions would be consolidated into four, each of which would be open to command by officers from other services. A new national guard, responsible solely to the Central Military Commission, would replace the People’s Armed Police. And three of the People’s Liberation Army’s four general departments would merge into one — the General Staff Department. The Ministry of Defense, now a figurehead, would be empowered to conduct mobilization and recruitment activities.

The plan is probably one of the more radical options on the table, and Beijing is certainly weighing more conservative approaches. The high level of detail in the report, however, suggests that the leaked proposal survived to a late stage in the deliberation process, meaning parts of it may actually make it into the final plan — especially the long-discussed consolidation of military regions and the promotion of joint commands.

The leaked details of the reforms largely conform with those Stratfor outlined in January 2014, soon after plans were announced. At the time, China was making moves to cut its military regions down to five as well as open up positions of military leadership — previously an option for only ground force officers — to officers in the navy, air force and possibly even Second Artillery Corps. The change to a four-region structure likely came late in the discussion; as recently as April, a U.S. Department of Defense report to Congress on Chinese military and security developments still predicted five regions. But if Beijing has in fact pared it down to four, they will likely consist of a Northeast Command, charged with protecting Beijing and the border with Russia and Korea; a Southeast Command, responsible for operations in the Pacific and Indian oceans; a Northwestern Command to stabilize Xinjiang and protect Gansu and Qinghai; and a Southwestern Command to secure Sichuan and Tibet. Even with the slight change in details, Stratfor’s projections for the overall reform trends still hold: increasing centralization, increased cooperation between services and the erosion of hard geographic boundaries.

The People’s Liberation Army’s current operational structure is centered on land-based warfare to be conducted within the framework of seven military regions. This is an artifact of the military’s primary Cold War mission: to conduct a “people’s war” against an invader, most likely the Soviet Union, by mobilizing the entire population to draw enemy forces into the interior and wear them down. However, the times — and the strategic situation in East Asia — have changed a great deal. Beijing now needs to build capabilities that will allow it to carry out missions along the Chinese periphery in areas that include the East China Sea, South China Sea and Taiwan. This will mean moving beyond a model centered on ground forces. Missions in distant waters are also growing in importance. These could include counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, evacuations of Chinese citizens in the Middle East and Africa as well as joint air and naval exercises beyond the first island chain. The projected reforms would free the military from its territorial focus and help to integrate other branches of the services more closely.

China’s leaders have understood for decades that the existing military structure is inadequate to meet the nation’s changing needs. But Beijing is just now overcoming the structural constraints that have barred reform. These included limitations in terms of capability, such as poorly trained personnel, outdated equipment, and primitive command and control. More important, however, were the political obstacles: military corruption as well as powerful entrenched interests in both top brass and the retired officer pool. The Chinese government has worked for years to overcome these limitations, not only making broad investments in modern equipment and weaponry research and development but also raising education requirements for new recruits, trimming redundant personnel and stepping up joint as well as transregional exercises. Military exercises in particular have laid the groundwork for the smooth and frequent cooperation between branches of the military.

Of course, the upcoming reforms will almost certainly reduce high-level staff positions and eliminate some patronage networks, prompting opposition among government and military officials — and especially among the People’s Liberation Army ground forces. It was to overcome this resistance that President Xi Jinping in 2013 launched a far-reaching and ongoing military anticorruption probe, which has helped purge over 30 generals this year alone. It also brought down two retired vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, who had been the highest-ranking generals in the People’s Liberation Army under Hu Jintao. Yet in spite of progress, resistance will persist or even worsen as reforms continue. Surveillance over military officers and intense anticorruption investigations are likely to intensify, as are moves to bar retired officers from influencing policy, which is part of an overall trend in all parts of the Communist Party.

The Chinese military will certainly become more professional as a result of these reforms, but only in a very specific sense of the word. The People’s Liberation Army will develop the organization and skills necessary to prevail in modern warfare. This, however, will in no way loosen the Communist Party’s hold over China’s armed forces. The interests of the Party will continue to dominate the military. And though the leaked plan would elevate the role of the Ministry of Defense — a government and not a Party organ — Beijing will most likely opt to reject that and other elements that reduce the influence of the Communist Party. Indeed, Chinese state media have continued to caution against calls to nationalize or depoliticize the People’s Liberation Army. Wary that reforms empowering the military could also erode Party control, the Party will be quick to slow and even reverse reforms if the careful balance between Party control and military effectiveness tips too far away from the Party. Whatever impact the reforms may have on the military’s capabilities, the People’s Liberation Army will remain the Party’s gun.

 Hauna Trimble is a young and promising political analyst. She is specialized in the changing political landscapes in the US and in the Middle East. She recently graduated from a prestigious university in the Middle East.

By electing an Afro-American president in 2009, Americans assumed they were taking large leaps to close the gaps between blacks and whites and finally leaving behind the sins of the past. Yet eight years later in the year 2015, America couldn’t be more divided than it was in the 1960’s. Just shy of a year away from the next U.S. presidential elections and already, the debates have been full of heat, controversy, and divisions. Racial tensions between whites and blacks on issues surrounding welfare, equal treatment and police brutality have never been higher.

The need for immigration reform and what to do about the millions of “undocumented” immigrants has become a crisis, with no consensus on how to deal with it. America is a truly divided nation, which has played a large role in the presidential debates we see today between the various Democrat and Republican candidates.

The Democrats have always benefited from attracting the minority and young vote, thanks to the benefits they promise minorities and the liberal perspectives they claim to represent among the youth. Meanwhile, the Republican Party has struggled to break out of the long standing impression they have as representing only the white, Christian, “greedy” Americans who are the supposed root of all minority, young, and female cleavages in the country. This has been pivotal in Obama’s election and reelection, and unless the Republican Party makes strategic moves to show something different, it will spell another inevitable defeat.

So, does the Republican Party have a chance to win over ethnic minorities? Yes, but it will have to make some radical changes in its presentation and message. Mitt Romney from last election may have been perfectly qualified to be president. But let’s face it, he didn’t stand a chance at winning. In the minds of minorities, Romney represented everything wrong with the Republican Party, and only confirmed the already preconceived notion that the party solely represents white Christian men.

It seems Republicans have a problem accepting the reality that these types of candidates really stand no chance in the face of rapidly changing demographics across the nation. The 2016 elections need to look vastly different. First of all, as ridiculous as it may sound, the Republican Party needs a minority to represent them, although this is just one out of many necessary things a candidate must possess. This point right here proves just how far America is from actually being a nation of equals, where minorities as the perceived victims can actually stand a better chance at getting a scholarship, keeping a job, or winning U.S. presidency, but the truth isn’t always pretty. Another thing that needs to happen is for the party to speak to the entire country, and not just Republicans. 

To expand on this point, the Republican Party needs to evolve to become more inclusive of the reality that America is in currently. This doesn’t mean changing republican values, policies, or goals, it simply means presenting itself in a way that shows its inclusion, empathy, and interest to serve the people, and not just themselves. For the Democrats, the appearance of including everyone is easy to portray through false socialist promises, even though socialism has done nothing more for America than further divide races and genders. Yet, for the Democrats, it’s easy to continue attracting minorities when Republicans focus on accusations more than they focus on what they can do to make America a better place for everyone.

Time and again, Republican candidates make statements that further enrage minority groups, isolating themselves to just their constant supporters. These statements may hold a lot of truth, yet focusing on blame and negativity is self-defeating, especially in politics. The point being, the Republican candidate needs to truly unify the country, and not divide and accuse.

A candidate such as Donald Trump may be refreshing for many people to listen to in his raw honesty. So many are tired of the political correctness of our time, and hearing someone like Donald Trump tell it like it is can be attractive. Yet, Trump is a risky candidate, because someone like him could further divide the country into extreme camps on opposite ends of the spectrum. We are at a time and place where we simply can’t afford more division. A candidate like Marco Rubio, however, would have a more wholesome, inclusive message to convey to the country, in a much less threatening manner. His minority background, ability to truly understand minority cleavages, coupled with his strong leadership and Republican views, would give him a real shot at delivering a message that benefits everyone. In any case, America is in a serious social crisis, and in need of a strong leader.

This leader can’t be just a minority, or just someone who is technically qualified. The Republican candidate needs to make sweeping strides on virtually every front. To demonstrate this point, a look at Ben Carson shows that being a minority just isn’t enough. Carson is a black Republican candidate, yet has utterly failed at capturing black supporters and may not really have what it takes to pull this country together. He is a world renowned brain surgeon, but does that mean he is qualified to be president? His platform severely lacks any sort of clarity, and his speeches do not seem to resonate with the minority populations, even though Carson is technically a minority himself.

This is why the selection of a Republican candidate needs to be a very wise, thought out process, because the reality is that the Republican Party needs to make some serious comebacks. They have a lot to offer America, yet their presentation needs some very real reforms. Who they chose as their representative of the Republican Party is extremely delicate, and any miscalculation will put their chance at winning over the minority vote, and ultimately the presidency, in serious jeopardy.

Adrien Gonin is a young and rising economic analyst. He studied Economics in top French and German University. He is widely recognized as an expert of European and American Economies.

Since 2003, The European Union and the U.S. have been preparing the Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement – called also TAFTA Treaty – a free trade deal in order to boost both economies by harmonizing commercial and trade norms.

What is the TAFTA Treaty?

A Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) also called TTIP, is a proposal to create a trans-atlantic free-trade area covering Europe and North America. Once complete, if combined with free trade agreements with Canada, Mexico and the European Free Trade Association,  it could form a free trade area covering a large portion of the two continents.

The TAFTA Treaty assembles negotiators representing big companies from many sectors (banking, energy, food, industry). Its goal is to reach common regulations to increase competition between companies. As a logical consequence, the consumer output should be higher quality product for lower prices.

The TAFTA Treaty would be the biggest agreement of its kind, and affects one quarter of global trade.

Nevertheless, a key issue remains hard to clear: are the positive effects given by the TAFTA Treaty to big companies really good for the citizens?

An undemocratic negotiation process:

Meanwhile the TAFTA Treaty has significant consequences on the market structure between the EU and US, the decisions are taken in secret behind closed doors by representatives of big companies. Journalists and neutral observers are not allowed to follow and report the negotiations of the TAFTA Treaty.

What are the issues behind this agreement?

• Importation of farming techniques from America to Europe

American practices in terms of agriculture are not appreciated by European consumers. The American law enables farmers industries to produce hormone-treated meat, chlorinated chicken or gmo which wouldn´t not be acceptable for local producer such as in France or Italy.  Those practices are nowadays still forbidden within the E.U. but American negotiators are holding pressure to develop their mass production on the other side of the Atlantic…

• Shale gas exportation from the U.S. to Europe

American companies are able to charge a low price for gas due to massive shale gas extraction. This measure first seems very positive for European households as the energy price is very high in Western Europe.   Nevertheless, the extraction of shale gas from the earth remains highly dangerous for the soils and groundwater, the costs and the responsibility for damaging the ground are not determined. This issue remains very important, especially as the COP 21 begins this week in Paris.

• Conflicts between different labor and union laws

European law structure enables more rights for workers. Workers have the right to be represented by unions. Unions have the right to negotiate with their employer, whether there are large corporations or not. On the other hand, American companies are not constrained to respect high European working conditions: collective negotiations between unions and employers do not exist, working standards are very low in the US.

A harmonization of working right between EU and US will result to fewer straight rules for European employers. European social gains may be threatened and results to impairments in working conditions.

• Investor-state settlement

The initial project of the TAFTA treaty allows international companies to charge states before international arbitrators to obtain compensation. What is the reason for claiming compensations? – The regulation of a state leading to a decrease in a company´s profits will be the main argument for companies to complain. In the end, the costs of these penalties will be paid by the consumers leaving in the state.

The impact on consumers would be massive: the possible cases for companies to attack states are boundless (e.g. minimum wage, taxes, measures for the environment).

Final Analysis :

 At the first look The TAFTA treaty seems to be, good news for everyone. But the safety standards provided by the states of the EU – beneficial for us on a daily basis could be damaged.

The first winners of the treaty are multinational big companies that will use economies of scale to maximize their profits. The citizens may not be the main preoccupation of the treaty.

Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Price winning economist in 2001 shares the same opinion: “Corporations everywhere may well agree that getting rid of regulations would be good for corporate profits. Trade negotiators might be persuaded that these trade agreements would be good for trade and corporate profits. But there would be some big losers – namely, the rest of us.”

The Islamic State’s use of natural resources to achieve its strategic goals is nothing new. Oil, one of the group’s biggest sources of funding, plays an especially important role in its calculations — something the countries fighting the Islamic State are increasingly coming to realize. And they have begun to adjust their target sets accordingly. The United States and France, for example, have begun to launch airstrikes against the group’s oil trucks and distribution centers, hoping to hamper its ability to pay for its military operations.

But what is less talked about, although no less important, is the Islamic State’s use of water in its fight to establish a caliphate. Its tactics have brought water to the forefront of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, threatening the very existence of the people living under its oppressive rule. If the Islamic State’s opponents do not move to sever the group’s hold over Iraqi and Syrian water sources — and soon — it may prove difficult to liberate the region from the Islamic State’s hold in the long term.

An Age-Old Conflict

Civilizations have long battled for access to water and founded their empires around great rivers. Historians believe that the ancient Sumerian city of Ur was favored by the empires that followed for its abundance of water and its proximity to the Persian Gulf. Other accounts say the city’s inhabitants abandoned it amid severe droughts and the drying up of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Today, drought and low rainfall compete with the manmade disaster of terrorism to destroy the same, once-fertile swathe of land stretching along the two rivers.

Governments and non-state actors alike have used water as a weapon for centuries. While the number of full-blown wars over water resources has been lower than one might expect, given how critical water is to any population’s survival, smaller conflicts have been numerous, destructive and deadly. The Middle East has fallen prey to this competition in recent years as states and groups have increasingly shifted from simply cutting off water supplies for a short period of time to diverting water flows or completely draining supplies in an attempt to threaten or coerce consumers.

The Islamic State is no exception. Since the group began expanding its territorial claims in western Syria, it has used water as a tool in its broader strategy of advancing and establishing control over new land. True, the Islamic State has also (and perhaps more visibly) targeted strategic oil and natural gas fields in both Syria and Iraq, but a close look at the group’s movements clearly indicates that the Tigris and Euphrates rivers hold a central role in its planning. Recognition of the Islamic State’s intention to organize its new caliphate around the Tigris-Euphrates Basin may prove helpful in the long-term fight against the group.

In 2012, the Islamic State emerged from the power vacuum created by the Syrian civil war and made its presence known in the western city of Aleppo. It had little in common with Syria’s other rebel groups, which were primarily focused on fighting the forces of Syrian President Bashar al Assad for regime change. Instead, the Islamic State was a terrorist organization with a clear agenda and strategy: It wanted to build an Islamic caliphate that would, from its perspective, follow the truest form of Islam as decreed by the Prophet Mohammed. Over the following year, the group moved quickly and decisively, cutting a path through Syria and toward Iraq, capturing the key towns of Maskana, Raqqa, Deir el-Zour and al-Bukamal  — all of which are positioned along the Euphrates River.

The Iraqi front didn’t look much different; the Islamic State easily captured the river towns of Qaim, Rawah, Ramadi and Fallujah, two of which (Rawah and Ramadi) gave the group direct access to two of Iraq’s major lakes, Haditha Dam Lake and Lake Tharthar. Meanwhile, the Islamic State pursued a similar strategy along the Tigris River, successfully capturing Mosul and Tikrit and attempting to seize other towns and cities along the way. In Iraq the goal was Baghdad, from which the group could rule a caliphate encompassing Syria and Iraq. While the oil and natural gas fields it seized along the way were a means for the group to threaten military forces and make money, the bodies of water and infrastructure were a means to hold the entire region hostage.

Historically, the Euphrates and Tigris rivers have been an important source of contention between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. The lack of cooperation and coordination between these countries on sharing the mighty rivers has led to a failure to regulate their use and an overconsumption of resources. Consequently, any and all activity by upstream nations regarding the water resources carries the risk of agitating tensions with downstream countries. With no regional coordination and poor security along the rivers themselves, terrorist groups — including the Islamic State — have been able to use water as both a target and a weapon. Not only have they destroyed water-related infrastructure such as pipes, sanitation plants, bridges and cables connected to water installations, but they have also used water as an instrument of violence by deliberately flooding towns, polluting bodies of water and ruining local economies by disrupting electricity generation and agriculture.

Since 2013, the Islamic State has launched nearly 20 major attacks (as well as countless smaller assaults) against Syrian and Iraqi water infrastructure. Some of these attacks include flooding villages, threatening to flood Baghdad, closing the dam gates in Fallujah and Ramadi, cutting off water to Mosul, and allegedly poisoning water in small Syrian towns, to name just a few. Most of these operations are aimed at government forces, designed to fight the military by using water as a weapon against them, though some targeted water infrastructure to disrupt troop movements. Such efforts also often have the added benefit of enhancing recruitment efforts; by allowing water to flow to towns sympathetic to the Islamic State’s cause, or even by simply doing a better job of providing necessary services, the group can attract more men and women to its ranks.

With water at the core of its expansionist strategy, the Islamic State has also ensured that bodies of water and their corresponding infrastructure have moved to the forefront of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. The control of major water resources and dams has, in turn, given the Islamic State a firm grip on the supplies used to support agriculture and electricity generation. Mosul Dam, for example, gave the Islamic State control over 75 percent of Iraq’s electricity generation while it was in the group’s possession. In 2014, when the group shut down Fallujah’s Nuaimiyah Dam, the subsequent flooding destroyed 200 square kilometers (about 77 square miles) of Iraqi fields and villages. And in June 2015, the Islamic State closed the Ramadi barrage in Anbar province, reducing water flows to the famed Iraqi Marshes and forcing the Arabs living there to flee. While coalition and government forces in both countries have managed to recapture some key water sites, the threat of further damage persists.

At the same time, governments and militaries have used similar tactics to combat the Islamic State, closing the gates of dams or attacking water infrastructure under their control. But the Islamic State’s fighters are not the only ones hurt by these efforts — the surrounding population suffers, too. The Syrian government has been repeatedly accused of withholding water, reducing flows or closing dam gates during its battles against the Islamic State or rebel groups, and it used the denial of clean water as a coercive tactic against many suburbs of Damascus thought to be sympathetic to the rebels.

Finding a Regional Solution

Because of its importance to both electricity generation and agricultural production, water has the power to run or ruin an economy. And since bodies of water often extend beyond any one country’s borders, history shows that the competition for water resources can often only be settled peacefully through regional cooperation. Before Iraq and Syria deteriorated, and groups like the Islamic State arose, countries around the Tigris and Euphrates rivers had only each other to contend with. And in late 2010, the leaders of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan appeared to be on the verge of making progress toward setting up an integrated economic region. The countries’ leaders called for regionwide cooperation on tourism, banking, trade and other sectors, and could have laid the foundation for further agreements on the distribution of shared natural resources like water. Though ambitious, the ideas and sentiments behind the proposals had the power to transform the region.

But politics prevailed, as is so often the case, and in less than a year the moment was lost. Had Turkey, Iraq and Syria taken the opportunity to act while political conditions were favorable, they would have found it easier to collectively tackle the Islamic State’s advance later on. Bodies of water could have been labeled regional commons and thus the collective responsibility of all parties, ensuring swifter reactions by the governments involved to protect the water and associated infrastructure from terrorism. This, in turn, would have better protected the people and areas surrounding the rivers and lakes in the region. Of course, it is easy to look back and lament actions not taken, but the point remains that there is still a chance for these countries to come together and start working collectively to protect the water resources they share.

There is no doubt that the Islamic State has a very clear strategy, one that extends even beyond Syria and Iraq and into the wider region. The group has established bases throughout North Africa, following a similar path of controlling key resources and using them as weapons against the populations and governments it seeks to coerce or destroy. It is time that nearby states and the international community re-examine what they know about the Islamic State’s tactics and formulate a new plan of action. Forces fighting the Islamic State must look at the region as a single integrated basin and bring bodies of water — and by extension, the populations dependent on them — to the forefront of their strategies. Water has always formed the core of civilizations; the Middle East — not to mention an Islamic State caliphate — is no different.