A decade ago, Nicaragua’s sluggish economy relied primarily on agricultural exports, including coffee and beef. But during the past 10 years, Nicaragua has cultivated its longest run of political and economic stability since 1979. The country has leveraged its low wages and preferential trade with the United States to attract investment into clothing factories, helping the country’s export revenue quadruple between 2007 and 2014. And high oil prices enabled Venezuela to subsidize Nicaragua’s domestic spending and fuel imports through the Petrocaribe alliance, giving Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega more leeway in economic planning. Despite occasional bouts of political protest and confrontation between supporters of the government and the opposition, politically motivated violence has been relatively minimal. But with falling global oil prices and the subsequent decline of Venezuelan foreign assistance, Nicaragua’s fortunes could soon change.

A year away from elections, it seems Ortega may still have the strength to rule for another five-year term, but diminishing aid from Venezuela will complicate Nicaragua’s economic planning in the near term and could eventually erode the Sandinista National Liberation Front’s tight control over national politics.

Since the implementation of the Central American Free Trade Agreement in 2005, reduced tariff barriers have given Nicaragua greater access to the U.S. market, and foreign investors have increased their cash flow into Nicaragua accordingly. Nicaraguan clothing exports, largely to the United States, went from less than $2 million in 2005 to around $2.7 billion in 2014. The low cost of doing business in Nicaragua, even relative to other Central American countries, has also contributed to the uptick in investment. The Nicaraguan minimum wage is between $109 and $245 a month — the lowest among its immediate neighbors, which are its biggest regional competitors for low-end manufacturing jobs.

Even still, waning assistance from Venezuela could threaten the continuance of this economic success story. Though Venezuelan aid to Nicaragua is a small portion of Venezuela’s total foreign aid, declining oil revenue has forced Caracas to make some cuts. At its height in 2012, Venezuelan aid to Nicaragua totaled $728.7 million — less than 1 percent of Venezuela’s reported oil export income for that year. But because Venezuela’s oil revenue was cut nearly in half this year and because Caracas is concentrated on making foreign debt payments and investments into the oil sector, Venezuela has cut some of its aid abroad. In Nicaragua’s case, aid in the first half of 2015 declined 23 percent from the year before, totaling some $193 million. Nicaragua depends on Venezuelan aid to augment public spending, and if assistance continues to fall, Nicaragua stands to lose a key source of political patronage.

Venezuela’s heavy subsidization of Nicaraguan public finances guaranteed some measure of financial stability throughout Ortega’s presidency. Direct loans from Venezuela’s state-owned oil firm, Petroleos de Venezuela, not only cushioned the blow of rapidly rising oil prices in the late 2000s but also helped Nicaragua fund food imports and subsidize public transport fares. Although the subsidies are only a small part of PDVSA’s total operating revenue, the aid given in 2014 represented about 32 percent of Nicaragua’s total budgeted income for 2015. And if Ortega’s government fails to fund socially sensitive programs such as public transport, on which it spent $16.5 million in the first half of 2015, it risks losing political support in the long run.

Still, the near term looks relatively benign for the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front. The party has slightly more than a year until the next general election, slated for November 2016, and it faces a divided and politically weak opposition. The only coherent opposition bloc is composed of the leftist Sandinista Renewal Movement and the more centrist Independent Liberal Party. The coalition commands less than 30 votes in congress, compared to the Sandinista National Liberation Front’s 61. With only a year until the election, voters might not feel the effects of reduced subsidies before re-electing Ortega. However, if he serves another five-year term, Ortega may have to enact greater fiscal discipline if Venezuela’s patronage continues to decline. So far, Ortega’s popularity has depended on his support of programs that benefit the voters, and an erosion of that public assistance would complicate his ability to govern in the long term.

Overall, the pace of the decline in aid will greatly influence how the next presidential term plays out. A sharp drop in assistance, combined with a drop in Petrocaribe subsidies, could lead to a quick reining in of public spending — something that would almost certainly harm the next government’s approval rating and could contribute to popular unrest. But luckily for Nicaragua, its relatively small size means that Venezuela can likely fund it for some time. Moreover, barring major political upheaval in Venezuela, Caracas’ aid to Nicaragua is more likely to decline slowly than to collapse suddenly.

Analysis

Dacian Ciolos replaced Victor Ponta as the prime minister of Romania on Nov. 17. And though his ascension may seem like the result of a Romanian political system in chaos, in fact it is the result of Romania’s foreign policy goals, U.S. and EU strategic interests in the region, and a general exasperation among Romanian voters, fed up as they are with the malfeasance of their traditional political parties. Ultimately, it will be these factors that compel the new prime minister to follow the same foreign policy as his predecessor.  

Ponta resigned Nov. 4 after Romanians took to the streets to protest the country’s pervasive corruption. For months, Ponta had been accused of a variety of wrongdoings, and allegations that corruption led to a nightclub fire in late October was the last straw for the already troubled politician.

Romania’s fight against corruption received support from abroad. The United States considers Bucharest a critical ally in the former Soviet periphery, and it believes it will be less receptive to Russian influence if it is politically stable, more transparent and more attractive for foreign investment. Accordingly, the United States has worked closely with Romania to strengthen the National Anti-Corruption Directorate. In recent months the institution removed several high-level officials and stripped some politicians of their immunity.

And it appears as though Ciolos wants to reciprocate the West’s desires for alliance. Indeed, Ciolos’ Cabinet, which is composed mostly of technocrats and officials who are friendly toward the West, shows that the new government wants to preserve its relations with the White House, NATO and the European Union. Ciolos himself is a former EU Commissioner, and he was selected by President Klaus Iohannis – well known for his advocacy of U.S.-Romania relations – after the legislature failed to make its own submissions. Notably, his Cabinet includes former members of the European Parliament, ambassadors to Western countries and businessmen. Together, the list of new leaders shows Bucharest’s clear intent to remain aligned with the West, which in turn will likely support the new government.

But none of this makes Ciolos’ new job any easier. His administration has ambitious plans to reform the country’s electoral system, make public administration more efficient, reform education and health care systems, support Moldova’s EU accession plans, and strengthen Romania’s role in the European Union. As expected, the government also proposed to reinforce its alliance with the United States and NATO.

Some of these goals could prove difficult to achieve. Despite Ponta’s resignation, the composition of the legislature has not changed. Ciolos’ government is supported by an unusual coalition, which comprises elements from Ponta’s center-left and its rivals among the center-right. Naturally, the policy priorities of these parties differ dramatically, and those differences will be more pronounced in the run-up to general elections in December 2016, during which parties will differentiate themselves to secure votes.

Ciolos’ appointment exemplifies how Romanian interests — its international affairs, its domestic social and political agenda — interact. Romanian politics may appear to be chaotic, but these impersonal geopolitical forces will continue to shape the country’s behavior despite electoral cycles and political conflicts.

Russia’s State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s Federal Assembly, and its Federal Council held an extraordinary session Nov. 20 to discuss issues related to terrorism. It is rare for both chambers to come together in session, let alone for a session to run into the night. The parliamentary meeting follows the release of a new poll showing that 65 percent of Russians fear that the Islamic State will carry out a terrorist attack inside Russia in 2016 — a number up from 48 percent last month.

Analysis

Russia has some experience when it comes to combating terrorism, especially in the Caucasus, but is seeking to expand its remit. Many of the proposals presented during the Nov. 20 session were more stringent penalties for terrorists and those aiding them. The leader of the Just Russia party, Sergei Mironov, even proposed restoring the death penalty — a highly controversial issue already denounced by the Kremlin. Other measures discussed included enhancing security at public events and transportation hubs such as airports and train stations, which have been targets in the past. Historically, Russia’s counterterrorism strategy focused on its own Muslim republics, such as Chechnya and Dagestan. Yet with the current threat emanating from abroad, many Russian lawmakers were quick to propose measures that would revoke travel passports issued to Russian citizens who visit conflict hot spots such as Syria and Iraq.

The FSB has done this before. When now-President Vladimir Putin came in to lead the FSB in 1998, he expanded the agency’s powers to combat threats in the North Caucasus. Since becoming president, Putin has sought to balance the power of the FSB with other intelligence and security services, though given the current risks and circumstances the FSB will probably seek to expand its responsibilities and authority.

Consolidating Power

The FSB wants more influence in a number of areas. First, it wants greater control of the Investigative Committee, which is comparable to the FBI in the United States, wielding judicial and police authority. The FSB has greatly influenced the Investigative Committee at times, but now the agency wants formal jurisdiction to influence the Investigative Committee’s actions. Second, the FSB wants more influence over its sister security service branch, the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), which oversees intelligence operations outside Russia. The FSB has jurisdiction over threats inside Russia and its borderlands, but because a threat to Russia’s heartland is originating from conflict zones such as Syria, that could give the FSB recourse to insinuate itself into its sister agency. Third, the FSB is highly interested in gaining greater access to Russia’s Chechen Republic. The FSB andChechen President Ramzan Kadyrov have long fought over control of security and intelligence operations in the Caucasus republic, with Kadyrov blocking much of the FSB’s activities in recent years. The death of prominent opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in 2015 did little to improve FSB-Chechen relations. The FSB could easily use the threat of Islamic State infiltration through Chechnya or the Northern Caucasus to expand the agency’s powers in the region.

Another consequence of Russia’s renewed focus on terrorism and external threats manifesting domestically could be another spike in xenophobic or nationalist movements. Nationalism is already at a record high in Russia following the conflict with Ukraine, anti-Russian sanctions enacted by the West, and the Russian annexation of Crimea. The Russian government has expounded these events into strong support for the Russian government, resulting in an approval rating for Putin currently around 89 percent. In the past, nationalist movements quickly turned into anti-Muslim or anti-foreigner sentiments. In 2013, non-state militias formed in the Volga region following a bus bombing. The militias ultimately ended up harassing and assaulting Muslims living in the region. In 2011, tens of thousands of Russians protested in Moscow and other large cities to “Stop Feeding the Caucasus,” a movement meant to pressure the Kremlin to cut federal subsidies to the Muslim Caucasus republics. Currently, the government is framing its newfound focus on terrorism in relation to the Islamic State and the Iraq and Syria battlespace, but this could easily mutate into an anti-Muslim reaction throughout Russia as the country comes to terms with its own history of domestic terrorism.

Beyond the threat of internal or external terrorism, the Kremlin could simply use the blanket reasoning of security as an excuse to increase the monitoring and coercion of opposition groups or other entities flagged as undesirable by the Kremlin. Russia will hold parliamentary elections in 2016, and the Kremlin has been particularly focused on preventing unsanctioned groups and individualsfrom making gains during a time of economic and political uncertainty. The Kremlin’s drive for control was evident during the 2015 local elections, when cities and regions were targeted based on their opposition to the Kremlin, which then swiftly derailed anti-government campaigns and movements before they could gain traction.

Summary

The Egyptian government failed to generate strong voter turnout for the first phase of its multi-step parliamentary elections ending Oct. 19. The government has delayed the election multiple times since the country’s last legislature was dissolved following the July 2013 military coup, citing at times logistical difficulties, security concerns or most recently difficulties drafting a fiercely debated electoral law. Voter turnout — which domestic media and government officials have put anywhere from 12 to 17 percent — fell far short of the over 60 percent that came out in May 2014 to elect incumbent President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

Al-Sisi’s government had been counting on strong turnout to legitimize the future legislature, empowering it to push through a series of significant economic reforms. If so few voters turn out for future stages of the election and public sentiment begins to turn against the still largely popular al-Sisi, dissent may delay political and economic reform initiatives, possibly defeating Cairo’s attempts to make itself less dependent on financial aid from Gulf states.

Analysis

As voters prepare to select their representatives, Egypt’s military-backed government is embroiled in political conflict with Islamist groups. It has been nearly four years since parliamentary elections in 2011 catapulted the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party into the political spotlight. This time, the Islamist party is banned from participating in elections. The president’s administration has conducted a far-reaching crackdown against the Freedom and Justice Party while simultaneously combating a rising insurgency along the Nile Valley and an entrenched Islamic State-affiliated militant presence in the Sinai Peninsula. In the face of such security threats, the Egyptian government needs a legislative body that can insulate the president from upcoming difficulties. But it must also be able to make necessary decisions regarding reform, security operations and the country’s political and economic profile. The economic aspect is especially important because Egypt is trying to meet the demands of financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and strategic backers such as the United States.

Islamist political forces, however, are not al-Sisi’s only concern. The years since the initial 2011 uprising against President Hosni Mubarak have not been easy for many Egyptians. Partially to blame for the general public’s current apathy and election fatigue is the fact that ordinary Egyptians have little confidence a future legislature will faithfully represent the public interest. Any parliament, they believe, will likely support the administration and its military backers. Many civil society groups and nongovernmental organizations fear that a parliament made up of former military and security figures, businessmen and pro-government forces will not be able to exercise sufficient oversight of the al-Sisi government.

The Need for Reform

Despite low voter turnout, the elections are significant in that the future legislature will have the ability to amend the constitution. Parliament has, among other powers, the ability to approve or dismiss the president’s selection for prime minister, withdraw confidence from the Cabinet and even impeach the president. It can also retroactively review the nearly 300 laws al-Sisi and his Cabinet have approved since the old legislature was dissolved in 2013. But a relatively pro-government legislature may refrain from exercising those prerogatives. Indeed, this is precisely the kind of parliament the al-Sisi government is hoping for: one that will willingly vote to reduce its own powers and largely lend support to government initiatives.

While trying to keep the legislature in check, al-Sisi will be watching carefully for dissent among his own supporters. The president’s struggling anti-insurgency campaign, Libya’s instability and Egypt’s tense relationship with the United States have all sown dissatisfaction and dissent in certain factions among the ruling elite. Similarly, Egypt’s lavish pension schemes — which are partially responsible for its vast military and the cohesiveness of its state bureaucracy — are becoming too expensive. The country’s industrialist class and the economic elite are competing for the state’s finite resources.

While the government is projecting the image of a stable and united administration, al-Sisi’s popularity is not absolute. Members of the military or security apparatus were allegedly behind the release earlier this year of several embarrassing recordings of the president speaking about international leaders, including the royal families of the Persian Gulf. The president is keen to drum up public support for the election, if only to push back against simmering opposition to his authority.

Egypt’s economic constraints will make it especially difficult for Cairo to follow its imperative of lessening financial and energy aid from outside powers, mainly long-term rivals in the Persian Gulf — the Gulf Cooperation Council. Following the onset of its own political and economic instability, Egypt has accepted GCC deposits, grants and oil shipments to manage its deficit spending. But in return for relieving Egypt’s economic stress, Gulf leaders such as Saudi Arabia expect Cairo to fall in line with their foreign policy priorities, such as committing forces to the fight in Yemen and providing support for Sunni rebels in Syria. But Egypt has little interest in Yemen. It would much rather redirect the GCC’s focus to Libya, where many of its own security problems originate. Moreover, Egypt has no tolerance for political Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood and is strongly opposed to facilitating a rebellion that has the potential to put Islamists in power in Damascus. The al-Sisi government has come out quite publicly endorsing Russia’s military reinforcement of the loyalists in Syria.

Until now, al-Sisi and his Cabinet have enjoyed relatively direct rule without legislative oversight, and upcoming elections are not likely to introduce much change. Based on Egyptian opinion polls and apathetic public sentiment, the new legislature will lack strong opposition groups that can check the president’s power. For now, al-Sisi’s direct control over policy will remain largely intact.

However, the more pressing challenge for the president will come not from the new parliament, but from among the political elite. Tensions within the ruling establishment may delay policies or exacerbate existing dissatisfaction among the general public. And as long as opposition constrains al-Sisi’s ability to enact much-needed structural reforms, the president will find it more difficult to restore Egypt’s economic independence and thereby reduce Egyptian dependence on the GCC for aid.

Bangladesh executed two opposition leaders for war crimes committed during the 1971 war to break away from Pakistan, a senior police official said Nov. 22, Reuters reported. Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid, an Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami party leader, and Salauddin Quader Chowdhury, a former Bangladesh Nationalist Party member, were hanged at Dhaka’s central jail shortly after President Abdul Hamid rejected their appeals late Nov. 21 for clemency. The Border Guard Bangladesh paramilitary force has been deployed across the country to tighten security amid concerns of unrest following the execution.

Capital punishment in Bangladesh is a legal form of punishment for anyone over the age of 16, but in practice is not applied to those under 18.

The death penalty may be used as a punishment for crimes such as murder, sedition, offences related to possession of or trafficking in drugs, offences related to trafficking in human beings, treason, espionage, military crimes, rape, hijacking planes, sabotage, or terrorism. It is carried out by hanging and firing squad, although the latter method has been contested since 1998.

There are over 1,000 people reported to be on death row. In November 2013, Dhaka Metropolitan Sessions Court sentenced 152 people to death for their role in the 2009 Bangladesh Rifles revolt.

Summary

Argentina is preparing to choose a new president, and the Kirchner-Fernandez clan’s 12-year rule is coming to an end. Argentines will head to the polls Nov. 22 in a vote that will pit the ruling Front for Victory’s Daniel Scioli against the more conservative Cambiemos coalition’s Mauricio Macri. Results from the first voting round, which was held Oct. 25, showed Scioli holding a three-point lead in the race.

Regardless of who wins, though, the next administration will bring with it some important economic and political changes. The new president will face the challenging tasks of reducing Argentina’s subsidy burden, encouraging foreign direct investment and negotiating renewed access to foreign credit markets. He will also face a sharply divided lower house of Congress, where intense political battles will be commonplace as Argentine parties vie for the votes they need to pass or block legislation.

Analysis

Results aside, the approaching presidential election could bring with it several benefits for the private firms operating in Argentina. The next administration will likely refrain from expropriations of private assets, which were a hallmark of former presidents Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Macri has also promised to repeal the country’s supply law, which gives the government greater oversight of the private sector and strengthens price controls on goods sold in the country.

But Argentina’s primary challenges in the coming years will be economic. Many of the factors that have complicated the country’s finances and politics in the past few years will remain in place well into the next presidential term. First, Brazil’s slowing economy, combined with Argentina’s protectionist trade barriers, is steadily eroding bilateral trade. (Argentine exports to Brazil, its largest trading partner, declined by about 27 percent between 2013 and 2014 and are expected to drop further this year.) Brazil’s economy, which is expected to contract by about 3 percent in 2015, is set to see only sluggish growth for the next few years, meaning that Argentina will have to look elsewhere to make up for fewer trade opportunities with Brazil. But even this will be difficult, since Argentina is geographically isolated and uncompetitive in the market for manufacturing exports.

Second, Argentina lacks the financial resources to significantly open its domestic market to private sector imports in the near future. Capital flight, high levels of public spending and falling investment and exports have steadily depleted the country’s foreign currency reserves. Though projected to rise slightly thanks to next year’s soybean and grain exports, Argentina’s stock of foreign currency (currently at about $26.1 billion) will not rebound enough to solve the country’s financial woes. So while the next president may try to loosen some of the restrictions on imports and the disbursement of foreign currency to importers, Argentina will not be able to reverse its protectionist stance overnight, and the country’s depleted currency stocks will continue to be an issue.

Argentina will also have to grapple with a federal deficit of at least 3.5 percent of gross domestic product, if not higher, as well as high inflation caused by rapid monetary expansion. The next administration could try to rein in spending in an attempt to cut inflation, but it would likely encounter resistance from some of its constituencies. Similarly, efforts to repeal price freezes and remove energy subsidies could create political blowback, especially in legislative elections set for 2017. The elections, which will decide half of the 257 seats in the lower house of the Argentine Congress, will be of crucial concern for the incoming president, who will have to deal with an almost evenly split legislature for the first two years of his tenure. Since the Front for Victory holds 109 seats and Cambiemos holds 92, both sides will have to negotiate with Argentina’s smaller political blocs to achieve a simple majority. This process will likely spur an intense competition for votes in the lower house for at least the first half of the next president’s term.

Argentina’s growing financial concerns will encourage the future administration to negotiate with its foreign creditors, especially the holdouts that have demanded the repayment of more than $1.3 billion in debt left over from the country’s 2001 default. The dispute plunged Argentina back into default in 2014, which has hampered its ability to borrow abroad ever since. Finding a solution to the current impasse would change that, but negotiations could also open the country up to even bigger debt payments, as could an October ruling by a U.S. federal court that other bondholders could seek payment of the roughly $7.4 billion in Argentine bonds that have been in legal limbo since 2001. Though Fernandez took a tough stance with these bondholders as part of her political platform, her two potential successors have not. This fact, coupled with the country’s dire financial situation, make it more likely that the next government will pursue talks with Argentina’s creditors.

The Nov. 22 election will bring Argentina a new leader, but the country’s underlying political and economic problems will stay the same. So although some business-friendly changes and moves to open up the economy can be expected from the next administration, which will undoubtedly be hungry for cash, it is unlikely that we will see any drastic changes in how Argentina’s economy interacts with the rest of the world.

After nearly a decade under conservative rule, Canada is now poised to move back toward the political center. On Oct. 19, Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party won the country’s parliamentary elections, positioning the 43-year-old leader to succeed Stephen Harper as Canada’s next prime minister. Trudeau will likely adopt a more centrist style of governance than Harper, prompting a review and refocus of Canada’s national security and foreign policy priorities. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the new administration will maintain support for energy initiatives that promote the diversification of the country’s hydrocarbons exports.

Analysis

Trudeau, the son of former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, emerged from the Oct. 19 elections with a solid majority in Parliament. With just shy of 40 percent of the vote, his Liberal Party won 184 seats, while the Conservative Party came in second with 99 seats and the leftist New Democratic Party trailed with only 44. Because of the Liberal Party’s sweeping victory, Canada will avoid the political turmoil that accompanies coalition building by minority parties — a situation that often creates room for votes of no confidence, uncertain policymaking and premature elections.

Once he is sworn into office, Trudeau’s first order of business will be to select his Cabinet. He will likely choose lawmakers with a range of experience levels, drawing from a pool of parliamentary members who served in previous Liberal Party governments. The new prime minister will also follow the Canadian protocol of picking Cabinet ministers and deputies who are representative of each of the country’s 10 provinces and three territories.

After he has formed his Cabinet, Trudeau will turn his attention to Canada’s international engagements. Under Harper’s Conservative Party administration, Canada conducted military interventions and operations in a number of the world’s conflict zones, including Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Ukraine and the Baltics. The Canadian government also took a strong stance against Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and against China on a variety of issues, including human rights. Trudeau will likely pull back somewhat, in terms of both rhetoric and troop commitments, from becoming involved in military operations that have a limited coalition mandate. But Canada will not disengage from the international community; on the contrary, under Trudeau’s rule, Canadian soft power and humanitarian interests will play a stronger role in Ottawa’s foreign policy. As a result, Canada will support multilateral initiatives in which there is a place for its influence.

At home, the incoming Liberal Party government will likely pick up where its predecessor left off in the realm of energy. Harper’s administration prioritized the development and diversification of export routes for Canada’s oil and natural gas resources. Trudeau will continue to pursue this goal, lending support for the construction of east-west pipelines and the controversial Keystone XL project. However, he will also push for greater oversight over new energy infrastructure projects to ensure that the pipelines address the concerns of environmental groups and the First Nations aboriginal peoples. Trudeau will work with provincial governments, particularly in Alberta and British Columbia, to achieve these goals and to win support for his Liberal Party in Canada’s Conservative hub.

As the new prime minister works to introduce a new style of governance in Canada — one that is dynamic, inclusive and less militarily active — he will encounter significant challenges on several other policy fronts. Canada’s recession continues to drag on, and the country remains constrained by its economic interdependency with the United States. Canada must also cope with high natural resource costs while its industrial and manufacturing base continues to search for growing markets for its outputs. With his campaign now over, Trudeau will have to shift his focus toward these issues if he hopes to turn Canada’s economy around.

Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari has finally selected all 36 members of his Cabinet, and not a moment too soon. While the Nigerian Senate still needs to approve his nominees so they can be sworn into office, Buhari has already taken his time in appointing his Cabinet almost five months after being sworn in as president. Patience has worn thin in corners of Nigeria as the new president’s opponents — and even some of his supporters — have waited to see what his policy priorities are and how they will be implemented. Despite the country’s need for cautious leadership and fair distribution of power to promote national stability, it is clear that various interests in Nigeria will move to protect, or in some cases win, their influence. And it will be the president who manages the country’s priorities and responses to them.

Analysis

At this point, Buhari has clearly prioritized the counterinsurgency campaign against the Islamist militant group Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi, more commonly known as Boko Haram. Former Chief of the Army Staff Gen. Abdulrahman Bello Dambazau’s appointment to the Cabinet, possibly as defense minister, attests to this. But continued suicide bombings in Nigeria’s North-East region raise tension and social displacements in the area. For example, suicide bombers struck the town of Maiduguri for the second day in a row on Oct. 16. And though the Nigerian military’s successful campaigns against Boko Haram forces have retaken population centers from the group, forcing it to shift away from conventional tactics and toward terrorism, continued advances will require further financial and political support.

However, Nigerians concerned with an effective response to Boko Haram are not only expecting a military offensive against the insurgents but also want a broader socio-economic plan to improve the impoverished region, mainly because its large pool of unemployed youth easily falls prey to militant groups. Social spending to improve economic standards would go a long way in reducing if not denying jihadists new recruits. However, diverting spending to the poorest region of the country is not an easy political sell for Buhari. The military needs funds to fight Boko Haram. Moreover, other regions want to support their economic bases and will pressure the president for the same finite resources.

In the country’s South-South, or Niger Delta, region, activists are awaiting clarity on Buhari’s intention to continue an amnesty program that provides material support to former militants belonging to groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. Buhari has worked with several Niger Delta leaders, including Cabinet nominee and former Rivers state Gov. Rotimi Amaechi, to facilitate continued stability in the oil-producing region. Some militant leaders such as Government Tompolo, who enjoyed patronage under former President Goodluck Jonathan, are continuing to see their private regional security operations contracts honored. Still, a long-term understanding between Abuja and the region’s political and militant elite has yet to be arranged. But again, like with the North-East region, it is politically difficult for Buhari to focus on this region and neglect others, especially since the Niger Delta enjoyed its turn commanding considerable influence under Jonathan, who hailed from the region’s Bayelsa state.

Buhari’s anti-corruption campaign, which started when he became president, has seen some high-profile developments as well. The president, seeking to fulfill his electoral pledge and make governance more transparent, has detained a few former high-level officials on corruption allegations and dismissed potentially poor-performing appointments made by the previous administration. Most recently, former Petroleum Minister Diezani Alison-Madueke, who served under Jonathan, was arrested on corruption allegations in the United Kingdom on Oct. 2. So far, Buhari has managed to drive his anti-corruption crackdown with the force of his personality alone. However, to sustain it, Buhari will need to institutionalize the campaign, ensuring that there are empowered government agencies to independently investigate, prosecute and convict on corruption charges without requiring Buhari’s close attention.

Talk of creating a special anti-corruption tribunal has emerged, but the president has yet to actually convict former government officials. Moreover, even prosecuting and convicting officials through domestic courts in a relatively timely manner will be a test of Buhari’s ability to follow through on his campaign promises on this popular issue. And while the Nigerian public wants the government to rein in corruption, there will be political costs to doing so, such as alienating other powerful political leaders who do not want to be investigated. Buhari, as with the other national issues, will need to be both careful and successful, before using that success to deflect the enemies he will undoubtedly make.

Similarly, the Nigerian president is also attempting to inject transparency into government accounts and finances. Buhari implemented a treasury single account on Aug. 9 to capture revenues from all government agencies and ministries at the Central Bank of Nigeria, reducing the risk that cash held by these departments could be misallocated if not outright stolen. Previously, government officials and the civil service practices enjoyed vast autonomy, having little to no financial oversight under Jonathan. Reintroducing such accountability measures, especially on political leaders who have grown accustomed to privilege, will be a burden for Buhari, who is already trying to substantially reform the regions and the country as a whole.

But Buhari has demonstrated that he is a cautious but forthright leader. He challenged powerful factions within his own All Progressives Congress that wanted him to follow his predecessors’ footsteps by taking advantage of his position to promote his support base’s narrow interests while shutting out his opponents. In doing so, he showed his ability to lead and cemented his administration’s control, enough to begin the process of reforming Nigeria. But asserting policy priorities will be a long-term effort given the country’s multiple political, economic and security challenges, as well as historical practices that undermine attempts to solve those problems. Some regions and political leaders will work to protect the influence they have won from previous administrations. Others will equally strive to win patronage for the first time after suffering neglect in the past. Buhari’s difficulties are only beginning, and so far he has only nominated a Cabinet.

In Colombia, a Peace Deal May Not Improve Security

Summary

On Nov. 8, Myanmar will hold its first nationwide general election since the country began transitioning from military to quasi-civilian rule in 2011. The scale of the vote is vast, with 91 parties competing for 498 parliamentary seats representing constituencies throughout the fractured, largely rural country, in addition to state-level positions. The new parliament will choose the next president in early 2016. International attention has focused primarily on the contest between the establishment Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), founded by the former military junta, and the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi.

The military has used the USDP to continue its dominance over the government since 2011. President Thein Sein, himself a former general, has overseen the opening of the country to a flood of foreign investment and has shepherded negotiations that culminated in a landmark cease-fire with eight major ethnic militant groups. The military-led move away from international isolation has been deliberately slow — a strategy rooted in concern that liberalization could unleash destabilizing forces that military rule had long helped contain. And the military elite has carefully managed the transition to democracy to ensure that their influence and interests would survive the whims of democracy.

Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that the National League for Democracy may be poised to carve into the military’s control over the government. The NLD could capitalize on frustration with the incremental pace of reform, the uneven distribution of the country’s nascent economic boom and lingering distrust of the military. These factors, along with the proliferation of ethnic minority parties and grassroots political forces, herald an increasingly incoherent political environment in Myanmar that will challenge even the military’s best-laid plans.

Analysis

In many ways, Myanmar’s military establishment has been preparing for this election for more than a quarter century. The National League for Democracy emerged as a unified and potent political force in 1988 amid a nationwide wave of anti-government protests. The military junta called elections two years later. Under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Myanmar’s revolutionary hero and founding father, the NLD shocked the junta by winning nearly 80 percent of the seats, compelling the ruling generals to annul the results and establish a new military government.

For much of the next two decades, the NLD was banned and hundreds of its members imprisoned, while Suu Kyi’s international stature grew from house arrest. The NLD boycotted the 2010 elections, which signaled the formal start of the generals’ transition. But the party fielded candidates in 2012 by-elections, giving the military’s liberalization drive much-needed legitimacy in the West and leading to a gradual easing of sanctions. The NLD won 43 of the 44 seats it contested in the upper and lower houses, including one by Suu Kyi, while the USDP lost ground. Perhaps because of this result, the government canceled a second set of by-elections planned for 2014.

The military’s historical pattern of retrenchment following opposition electoral successes naturally raises questions about what would happen if the NLD triumphed again. But from the military’s point of view, the slow transition to a participatory system, as laid out in the 2003 “Roadmap to Discipline-Flourishing Democracy,” has unfolded largely as planned.

The Military’s Worldview

The roadmap set in motion a gradual shift that would help to maintain a high degree of military influence in the new political order, allowing broader public engagement without undermining, in the military’s view, the foundations of the country’s stability and power. In this, Myanmar has mirroredIndonesia’s 1998 transition from over 30 years of New Order rule.

The military’s cautious embrace of democracy is, in part, a response to the inherent geopolitical challenge of governing Myanmar, a country whose fractious geography and pockets of resource-rich territory have continually nurtured powerful ethnic militant groups. The key divide is between the lowland valleys of the Irrawaddy River dominated by the majority ethnic Bamar and the highland areas home to numerous ethnic minority groups. Indeed, since taking power in 1962, the military has felt it imperative to push ethnic armed groups out of the core and into the resource-rich border areas and to hinder political forces that may weaken its ability to do so.

But the military’s heavy-handed pacification strategies alienated it from the international community. And continued isolation left it poor, weak and heavily — over time, almost-exclusively — reliant on Chinese investment to fuel even its relatively anemic economic growth through the 1990s and 2000s. For Myanmar, this was geopolitically untenable, particularly as China emerged from its own spell of isolation to an era of breakneck growth and newfound ability to project power across its borders. Thus, the military establishment increasingly recognized the benefits of an opening to the West that would usher in investment and give the country strategic balance.

Still, the military could not ignore the potential for disorder and fragmentation that might flow from liberalization. So today, in practice, the roadmap means constitutional guarantees to give the elite a degree of buffer from the political forces that they see as a threat to an orderly transition shepherded by the military.

Discipline-Flourishing Democracy in a Divided State

The NLD is widely tipped to win a substantial number of seats, though there are no polls with which to evaluate this claim. The bar for USDP, however, is relatively low. The military — and the establishment — already has substantial protection and extensive powers under the constitution. Amendment would require a vote of more than 75 percent of the legislature, followed by a nationwide referendum. Because the constitution reserves 25 percent of seats in both the upper and the lower houses of parliament for military officers directly appointed by the armed services, any change would require broad military support. The military has also stuffed the bureaucratic ranks with its retirees. Meanwhile, military figures seized control of an array of lucrative enterprises privatized during the opening.

As a result, the Myanmar military, its retirees in parliament and the bureaucracy, and its business allies control many of the country’s levers of power and remain far and away the most coherent force in the country — however popular the NLD may prove to be. Whatever its success at the polls, the NLD will still have to bargain for clout — even if it overcomes the military’s constitutional advantages and wins enough seats to control the speakerships and, possibly, appoint the next president in early 2016 — and the military establishment will still be able to largely set the pace of reform.

The NLD’s ability to push forward even run-of-the-mill legislation will likely be complicated. Although Aung San Suu Kyi has been acclaimed as a democracy icon internationally, in many parts of Myanmar she is still seen as a representative of the interests of her majority Burman ethnic group. This is important. The Nov. 8 election will have two essentially separate theaters: the core areas and the ethnic periphery.

The southern-central Burman-dominated part of the country will fill 291 seats (41 percent of parliament), while the ethnic areas will fill 207 seats (31 percent). The USDP and the NLD are among the few parties running nationwide, but nearly two-thirds of registered parties are ethnically based — up from 40 percent in 2010. Many of the ethnic regions are split among numerous parties representing the overlapping constituencies. Minority voters will be choosing between parties led by their ethnic brethren; the NLD, which represents a vote against the oft-despised military but is not as uniformly popular among minorities as mainstream narratives suggest; and the USDP, which has channeled development funds and infrastructure to these areas and whose support from Buddhist nationalists extends beyond the Burman core. The ethnic parties thus have a strong chance of gaining a sizable number of seats and greatly complicating the picture in parliament, which for the past three years has been divided essentially between the NLD and USDP.

Though most ethnic groups are fragmented into a number of competing parties, one ethnicity has managed to unify its factions: the Rakhine. The Rakhine comprise 3.5 percent of Myanmar’s population but control a western state that fronts the Bay of Bengal. Rakhine state is also the origin point of an oil and natural gas pipeline to China and home to the lucrative Shwe natural gas fields, a key driver of GDP. The Rakhine parties have merged into the Arakan National Party, which has a strong chance of winning many of the 78 seats it is contesting. The party’s leadership has already said its ambition is to lead the state-level parliament and gain presidential appointment to the chief minister post, suggesting it would make a deal to do so.

The Rakhine are also notable because their state is the flashpoint of a nationwide movement toward Buddhist nationalism, which has manifested itself most concretely in communal violence against Muslim minority ethnic Rohingya. Unlike the small ethnic parties, this movement has the potential to transcend ethnic boundaries: Between 80 and 89 percent of the country practices Buddhism, including the majorities of the ethnic Burman, Shan, Rakhine, Mon and Karen. So far, the organization forwarding this movement has been the Race and Religion Protection Association, which is pro-Buddhist and anti-Muslim (and foreigner). A pro-Buddhist party also seen as aligned with the military, the National Development Party, was founded in July 2015 and is contesting a stunning 365 seats. The USDP has backed anti-Muslim bills in parliament as well. If the Arakan National Party, National Development Party and USDP can strike bargains over these issues, a Buddhist nationalist bloc has the chance of emerging in parliament, much like Sri Lanka. As a result of this rising sentiment, the NLD has found it difficult, for example, to defend the ethnic Rohingya and has been criticized when its leaders speak up.

New Democracy, New Uncertainties

As a result, Myanmar will emerge from the Nov. 8 polls with a more pluralistic, complex and racially charged political environment at a time when rapid growth and change heightens the stakes.

If the USDP does sufficiently well, it will certainly have to contend with a more robust NLD presence and the unpredictability of swing-voting ethnic parties. If the NLD sweeps the polls, to govern from a position of strength that does not threaten the military’s core interests beyond what it can tolerate, the party will still need to negotiate some sort of status quo with the ethnic parties and the USDP, not to mention the broader military establishment. A constitutional clause bars Suu Kyi from running for the presidency, but if an NLD win puts it in position to appoint the next president in January, there is an outside chance that it could expose unforeseen fractures in the military, further clouding the picture — particularly if it tries to peel off moderate military officers by appointing a former general like recently ousted USDP chief Shwe Mann.

Either party would face immediate and seemingly intractable problems, such as implementing the Nationwide Cease-fire Agreement and finding a way to pacify the powerful ethnic militias that have held out from negotiations. An unstable parliament that reflects a broader power struggle and changing of the guard would be less than conducive for addressing these and challenges to come. The military elite may have been planning for this election for 27 years, and in doing so their interests and perks of power have likely been largely secured. They can also look at neighbors such as Thailand to see how militaries can ease overt control but remain their country’s ultimate arbiters of power. But if the roadmap to democracy ends at elections, the next stretch is likely to be anything but orderly.

An increasingly complex political environment could present certain opportunities for countries such as China, which has held talks not only with USDP and NLD but also with the Arakan National Party. Beijing might manage to regain some of the influence it lost in the 2011 transition if it can play these parties off one another. The West, if Suu Kyi’s NLD is in power, will also find it easier to engage with Myanmar, perhaps increasing ties and investment.