A lack of coordination among Germany’s officials is chipping away at the popular perception of the Berlin government as a well-oiled machine. In the latest example of internal discord, a government spokesperson said Thursday that Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere had decided to reintroduce EU regulations on asylum seekers without first informing the country’s chancellor or refugee coordinator. On the surface, this behavior might seem erratic or even indicate a competition for power among German ministries taking place beneath the surface, but in reality it hints at a much deeper problem — one that could seriously undermine Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government and have wide-ranging repercussions for the rest of Europe.

The ongoing refugee crisis has overwhelmed Merkel. The German chancellor is famous for her ability to sense the direction of public opinion and adjust her policies accordingly. This time, though, many think she may have miscalculated. When asylum seekers began arriving en masse to Germany early this summer, Merkel promised that her country would receive them with open arms — and open borders. And Germans initially supported her decision, which they saw as an opportunity to show solidarity to those in need.

But as the influx of people grew, many Germans started to worry that their government had failed to assess the true magnitude of the crisis. Suddenly, Merkel was no longer the infallible leader who could do no wrong but an impulsive head of government who had put her country in danger. Some began to see the chancellor’s famous statement about refugees — “we can manage” — as proof that Berlin had lost control of the immigration problem.

Doubt began to build among the German people, and cracks formed within the coalition government. The center-right pushed for a tougher stance on immigration, while the center-left found itself trapped between its ideological sympathy for asylum seekers and its need to respond to voters’ demands. Conservative lawmakers who were already upset by what they perceived to be a soft stance on Greece renewed their vocal criticism of Merkel. As a result, the German administration hardened its position on migration while chaos within the government reached new heights. Questions arose about whether Merkel would be able to complete her third term, which is set to end in late 2017.

At the moment, Merkel’s position is not under threat. Even if Germany’s conservatives decide to withdraw their support, the process required to replace a German chancellor is extremely cumbersome and requires lawmakers to show that they can appoint a new government to replace its fallen predecessor. But if the center-right chooses to stop backing Merkel, the center-left probably will not be far behind. At that point, early elections would be nearly impossible to avoid.

Nobody in Germany is ready for a new round of elections, at least not right now. The popularity of Merkel’s conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has declined since the refugee crisis began, which has reduced the party’s appetite for an early vote. Meanwhile, Germany’s center-left is still trying to sort out its own contradicting imperatives and has no clear candidate to put forth for the chancellorship. And as the country’s major parties struggle in the polls, support for the anti-immigration Alternative for Germany party has reached a record high of about 10 percent, and attacks against immigrants are becoming more frequent. Altogether, the complexity of Germany’s current political situation means that the chances of new elections taking place in 2016 are slim.

Still, many things could happen in the coming months that would have long-term ramifications for the country and the Continent. Even if Merkel keeps her job, the ruling coalition could become increasingly ineffective, and infighting over her succession could undermine her leadership. Elections in several German regions in 2016 will test the popularity of the parties within Merkel’s coalition, and the outcome will affect their calculations about seeking early elections. Should the CDU perform poorly, party members will probably start planning for a future without Merkel.

The problem is, the CDU does not have many natural successor candidates to choose from. The only party figure who rivals Merkel is Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble, an experienced politician who lost his race to head the CDU to Merkel over a decade ago. The Greek crisis revealed a more virulent side of Schaeuble, who went so far as to suggest that Athens be expelled from the eurozone, but he has remained relatively quiet throughout the refugee crisis and has only sporadically criticized the government’s policy. With his image as the defender of Germany’s fiscal stability and economic interests, some think Schaeuble may be preparing to challenge Merkel for her post.

Regardless of who heads the government, though, the current situation in German politics is important for several reasons. First, a government too focused on dealing with internal disputes and preparing for new elections will be less effective in leading the European Union as it deals with a number of major issues, including heightened tensions with Russia and the migration of massive numbers of refugees. Second, the emergence of a political crisis as the already-existing migration crisis plays out could lead to a more inward-looking and Euroskeptic government. This year’s events have already debunked several myths about the European Union, from the irreversibility of the eurozone to the sanctity of open borders; if a new German government arises from the ashes of the immigration and Greek financial crises, its effects will be felt across the entire bloc.

The fighting in eastern Ukraine may be on the verge of getting worse, perhaps even moving beyond skirmishes to actual limited offensives. Over the past week, we have seen an uptick in fighting along the demarcation line in eastern Ukraine, as well as movements of equipment back to the front line by both sides.

At the same time, it is becoming clear that Ukraine will not be implementing legal changes as required by the Minsk agreement within the timeframe that was put forward, and deadlines will have to be extended for the accord to be implemented. And pushing back the Minsk agreement implementation timeline means European sanctions on Russia are unlikely to expire in January, diminishing the incentive the separatists and Moscow have to tamp down the fighting.

Analysis

The situation on the demarcation line had been relatively calm since Sept. 1, and cease-fire violations were becoming a rarity, but this has changed since the end of October. Independent reports of cease-fire violations in the Donestk sector have started to emerge more frequently, and although they were not initially mentioned in official accounts on the status of the cease-fire, the volume of infractions, which are now rather overt, has continued to increase.

Separatist forces and the Ukrainian army were scheduled to start removing lower-caliber mortars from the front line in the Donestk sector Nov. 6. But mortars are being used once again. Both sides have also started bringing equipment that had previously been withdrawn back to the front line. These movements do not necessarily mean either side is planning to ramp up military activities on the demarcation line — they are a logical consequence of the uptick in fighting — but they are still worrying. Each side will be forced to put into place contingencies to deal with an offensive from the other.

Withdrawals had been taking place on track with the timeline for the implementation of the Minsk agreement, and tanks, artillery pieces and heavy mortars had already been removed. Initially, cease-fire violations involved the use of small arms almost exclusively, including rifles, heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. As the escalation continued, however, mortar fire began to be seen, and there were a few reports of the use of heavy artillery and tanks. One incident even mentioned the firing of a Grad rocket, which landed in the center of Donetsk. There is no evidence that the rocket was launched from Ukraine-controlled territory, but within the conflict the use of Grad rockets stands as a reminder of the most intense periods of fighting.

There are clear indications that Moscow is still in control of the situation in separatist-controlled areas. A high-level Russian official recently paid a visit to Donetsk, and Russian troops are still visibly present in the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. It is notable, however, that the escalation over the past weeks has been concentrated only in the area north and west of the city of Donetsk. The Luhansk and Mariupol sectors have been less active. This suggests that Moscow or separatist leaders have not given a general order for separatist militias to engage Ukrainian forces all across the contact line. It could also simply mean preparations for an operation in the Donetsk area are still underway.

No major preparations are visible right now that would indicate offensive operations are looming, but the Donetsk sector is the gateway to towns such as Slovyansk and Kramatorsk — areas the separatists once held. As the prospect of Kiev immediately implementing the Minsk agreement fades — and with it any hope in Moscow for the imminent removal of sanctions — there are fewer reasons for the Ukrainian separatists in the east to clamp down on cease-fire violations. And as violations go up, so does the risk of a return to active offensives.

The concept of the failed state is meaningless. It was invented as a rationale to impose US interests on less powerful nations.

In the same week that the investigative reporter Jeremy Scahill spoke of the need for the US to “take a humility pill”, we’ve been subjected to precisely the opposite – yet another instalment of Foreign Policy magazine’s annual Failed States Index, complete with accompanying “postcards from hell” purporting to show what it’s like “living on the edge in the world’s worst places”.

Quibbling with the many bizarre claims of the index is tempting (Kenya is “less stable” than Syria, we learn), but in the end such gripes only give credibility to this tedious yearly exercise in faux-empirical cultural bigotry. For anyone interested in actually finding out about places such as Yemen or Uganda, the index is probably the last place you’d want to go. But what’s more interesting, and more helpful in understanding what the index really does, is to grasp that the very concept of the “failed state” comes with its own story.

The organisation that produces the index, the Fund for Peace, is the kind of outfit John le Carré thinks we should all be having nightmares about. Its director, JJ Messner (who puts together the list), is a former lobbyist for the private military industry. None of the raw data behind the index is made public. So why on earth would an organisation like this want to keep the idea of the failed state prominent in public discourse?

The main reason is that the concept of the failed state has never existed outside a programme for western intervention. It has always been a way of constructing a rationale for imposing US interests on less powerful nations.

Luckily, we can pinpoint exactly where it all began – right down to the words on the page. The failed state was invented in late 1992 by Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, two US state department employees, in an article in – you guessed it – Foreign Policy, suggestively entitled Saving failed states. With the end of the cold war, they argued, “a disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community”. And with that, the beast was born.

What followed in the essay was a grumpy version of the history of the “third world” after 1945, in which Helman and Ratner lamented that the claims of “self-determination” made by colonised peoples had ever been established as a major principle for organising international affairs. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, Helman and Ratner argued, the time for fripperies such as state sovereignty for third world nations was over. What these failed states needed was the ever-benign “guardianship” of the western world. We westerners would keep hold of our sovereignty, of course; they would make do with something called “survivability” instead, and be grateful for it.

 Details are still emerging as to precisely who was responsible for the Nov. 13 Paris attacks. Sorting through the jumble of misinformation and disinformation will be challenging for French authorities, and for outside observers such as Stratfor.

While the Islamic State has claimed credit for the attack, it is still uncertain to what degree the Islamic State core organization was responsible for planning, funding or directing it. It is not clear whether the attackers were grassroots operatives encouraged by the organization like Paris Kosher Deli gunman Ahmed Coulibaly, if the operatives were professional terrorist cadres dispatched by the core group or if the attack was some combination of the two.

Analysis

French President Francois Hollande publicly placed responsibility for the Nov. 13 attack on the Islamic State, declaring it an act of war. This French response to the Paris attacks is markedly different from that of the Spanish Government following the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. Instead of pulling back from the global coalition working against jihadism, it appears that the French will renew and perhaps expand their efforts to pursue revenge for the most recent assault. The precise nature of this response will be determined by who is ultimately found to be the author of the Nov. 13 attack.

To date, there has been something akin to a division of labor in the anti-jihadist effort, with the French heavily focused on the Sahel region of Africa. The French have also supported coalition efforts in Iraq and Syria, stationing six Dassault Rafale jets in the United Arab Emirates and six Mirage jets in Jordan. On Nov. 4, Paris announced it was sending the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to enhance ongoing airstrikes against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. To date, French aircraft have flown more than 1,285 missions against Islamic State targets in Iraq, and only two sorties in Syria.

France has numerous options for retaliation at its disposal, but its response will be conditioned by who was ultimately responsible. If it is found that the Islamic State core group was indeed behind the Nov. 13 attack, France will likely ramp up its Syrian air operations. The skies over Syria, however, are already congested with coalition and Russian aircraft. With this in mind, the French may choose to retaliate by focusing instead on the Islamic State in Iraq, or perhaps even other Islamic State provinces in places such as Libya. Another option would be to increase French programs to train and support anti-Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria, or even to conduct commando strikes against key leadership nodes. France also has the option of deploying an expeditionary force like it did in the Sahel, although that would probably require outside airlift capacity from NATO allies, especially the United States.

European Ramifications

The Paris attacks occurred during a Europe-wide political crisis over migrant flows from the Middle East, Asia and Africa. A Syrian passport was found near the body of one of the Paris attackers, prompting a Greek official to say Nov. 14 that the name on the document belonged to a person who passed though Greece in October. This news means that a number of politicians critical of the European Union’s response to the immigrant crisis will amplify their disapproval. In particular, advocates who want to end the Schengen agreement, which eliminated border controls in Europe, will use Paris to support their cause.

This has already begun. Poland became the first country to link the Paris attacks to the uptick in immigration. On Nov. 14, Polish Minister for European Affairs-designate Konrad Szymanski said the Paris attacks make impossible the implementation of an EU plan to distribute asylum seekers across the Continental bloc. As expected, France’s National Front party also demanded the end of the Schengen agreement. In a televised speech, party leader Marine Le Pen said France has to “recapture control of its borders.”

In Germany, Bavarian Prime Minister Horst Seehofer said the Paris attack demonstrates that border controls are more necessary than ever. Seehofer has been very critical of the German government’s handling of the refugee crisis, demanding permanent border controls as well as faster repatriation of asylum seekers. The Paris attack will likely strengthen his position and further weaken the government of Chancellor Angela Merkel, which was already facing internal dissent because of the migration crisis. In recent weeks Germany has seen an increase in anti-immigrant violence, including arson attacks against refugee shelters. The Nov. 13 attacks may encourage more extremist groups across Europe to attack asylum seekers.

The anti-Schengen camp will feel vindicated by a parallel event that took place in southern Germany last week, when a Montenegrin citizen was arrested while allegedly driving to Paris with several weapons. While German police have not established a direct connection between this incident and the Nov. 13 attacks, they have said that a link cannot be ruled out. The fact that this man was from Montenegro — a country in the Western Balkans — and made it to Germany in his car will strengthen the demands for stricter border controls along the so-called Balkan route of migration, which connects Greece to Northern Europe.

The Paris attacks will therefore improve the popularity of anti-immigration parties in many European countries, and continue to weaken popular support for the Schengen agreement. Several countries, including Germany, Sweden, Slovenia and Hungary had already re-established border controls because of the immigration crisis. Hungary and Slovenia have gone as far as building fences along their borders. After the Nov. 13 attacks, most EU governments will find it hard to justify a policy of open borders.

Until Nov. 13, the eight attackers responsible for the night of violence in Paris were just a handful of radical Islamists in a large universe of Islamist radicals in France. Many of these radicals are nonviolent, while a small segment of them are extremists who espouse violence to achieve their radical agenda — the type we refer to as jihadists.

Yet even among the jihadists who advocate violence, there are divisions. Some maintain that jihad should be waged only defensively in support of fellow Muslims being oppressed or attacked in places such as Syria. Another subset advocates for attacks in a Western country such as France. Even among the latter group, there are those whose threats are merely hot air and those who are actually willing to act. Even among those willing to attack there are actors who pose different degrees of threat.

For French authorities, sorting through the universe of potential attackers to identify those who pose the greatest risk is a daunting challenge — as it is for any other government. The process is like a shark attempting to select a few fish from among a vast shoal of baitfish swimming in unison. A shark has an incredible sensory array that is extremely effective at identifying prey to be devoured by its rows of formidable teeth. But the shoal provides security by making it next to impossible for the shark to identify the specific individual fish its needs to target.

This is exactly the situation in which the French authorities find themselves. They have incredible intelligence capabilities (sensors) and very capable police and military forces (teeth). Yet, those intelligence and enforcement resources are quite limited and can be overwhelmed by the sheer size of the shoal of potential jihadist attackers.

It requires an incredible amount of resources to maintain live telephone taps on one target, much less 24/7 physical surveillance. This means that security services very quickly reach their capacity. Thus, they need to use risk assessments to rank the potential threats and deploy their resources selectively against those threats deemed the most dangerous. This is especially true in a democratic country such at France, where there is rule of law and one cannot just conduct sweeps to arrest every known potential threat and then sort them out in prison. But frankly, as seen in even authoritarian countries, one simply cannot arrest (or kill) their way out of the problem and, often, draconian measures serve only to fuel anger and resentment, further aiding in radicalization.

Because of this reality, some attackers will slip through the screen, no matter the proficiency of security services. Once they attack, they are immediately removed from the shoal of potential threats and are subjected to an incredible amount of scrutiny. Their electronics will be seized as evidence and searched, and their past travel, associations and communications will be reviewed under a microscope. Under this heavy scrutiny, investigators will undoubtedly find clear warnings and indicators that the attackers were up to no good before the attack. Indeed, we will undoubtedly that some, if not all the attackers had previously come to the attention of the authorities.

To use another analogy, prior to the attack, the authorities had a mountainous pile of puzzle pieces with no frame or reference picture — some of those pieces could have led them to these attackers had they been assembled. But sorting through a gigantic pile of pieces of data and putting those pieces together without a frame of reference is often very difficult. Following this attack, the French authorities now have both the frame and the reference picture, and as they examine individual pieces of information, they will be able to place them into context using the frame of reference and (in retrospect) discover smoking guns.

Many will criticize the French government for missing such obvious clues, but those who do have lost sight of the initial challenge of the shoal of suspects and the vast amounts of data associated with each individual fish. Hindsight can be far more acute than foresight.

What we know so far: The Islamic State has claimed responsibility for multiple attacks in Paris. 

—President Francois Hollande called the attacks an “act of war” and said France’s response would be “merciless.” He declared a nationwide state of emergency late Friday.
—Hollande said 127 people had died in multiple attacks. French officials said there were eight known attackers—seven of them suicide bombers who had blown themselves up. The eighth was shot dead by police.

—There were at least six attacks: the Bataclan concert hall; Stade de France (the national stadium), La Carillon bar in the 10th arrondissement, La Petit Cambodge in the 10th arrondissement, La Belle Equipe in the 11th arrondissement, and La Casa Nostra in the 11th arrondissement.

The Islamic State appears to be claiming responsibility for multiple attacks in Paris on Friday night that killed at least 127 people and wounded dozens of others.
Here’s part of the statement from the group, translation for which was provided by SITE, which tracks militant organizations:

The One World Trade Center spire is lit blue, white and red after New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo announced the lighting in honor of dozens killed in the Paris attacks Friday, Nov. 13, 2015, in New York. French officials say several dozen people have been killed in shootings and explosions at a theater, restaurant and elsewhere in Paris. (AP Photo/Kevin Hagen)

Let France and those who walk in its path know that they will remain on the top of the list of targets of the Islamic State, and that the smell of death will never leave their noses as long as they lead the convoy of the Crusader campaign, and dare to curse our Prophet, Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him, and are proud of fighting Islam in France and striking the Muslims in the land of the Caliphate with their planes, which did not help them at all in the streets of Paris and its rotten alleys. This attack is the first of the storm and a warning to those who wish to learn. 
Speaking on national television earlier Saturday, President Francois Hollande called Friday’s attacks an “an act of war … prepared and planned from the outside, with accomplices inside.”

He said France’s response will be “merciless against the terrorists.” Hollande declared three days of mourning for the victims, as France announced a series of security measure in the wake of the attacks, including the indefinite closing of the Eiffel Tower.

On Friday, as the attacks were unfolding and the scale of the carnage unclear, Hollande declared a nationwide state of emergency. The attacks are the worst violence on French soil since World War II, and the worst in Europe since 2004 when coordinated blasts on Madrid’s commuter train system killed 191 people. The attacks also came 10 months after two Islamist gunmen killed 11 people at the offices of the Paris-based Charlie Hebdo, the French satirical magazine. Several attacks around Paris that followed the Charlie Hebdo massacre killed an additional five people.
France was already on high alert following those attacks when the events of Friday night unfolded. There were attacks on two restaurants in the 10th arrondissement (at least 12 dead in gun attacks) and two on restaurants in the 11th arrondissement (at least 24 dead). The national stadium, where France was playing Germany in a soccer match, was also attacked (at least three attackers dead), as was the Bataclan concert venue, which was packed with fans of Eagles of Death Metal, a rock band from California (at least 80 dead).

A clip on Vine showed the moment of the attack during the soccer match.
According to L’Express, Hollande was in attendance, but was moved to safety.

Reactions

Neighboring countries, including Italy and Belgium, said they were increasing security following the attacks, condemnation of which was near-universal.
Speaking in Vienna, where he is attending a meeting on the Syrian civil war, John Kerry, the U.S. secretary of state, called the attacks “vile, horrendous, outrageous.” British Prime Minister David Cameron vowed to do “whatever we can to help” France. “We are crying with you,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel said. “Together with you, we will fight against those who have carried out such an unfathomable act against you.” On Friday night, even as the events were unfolding, President Obama called the situation “heartbreaking.”

A leading British member of the Islamic State, known as Jihadi John, and three other foreign militants have been killed in U.S.-led airstrikes in Raqqa, Reuters reported Nov. 13, citing the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

The Briton was featured in Islamic State videos showing the killing of American and British hostages. An unnamed U.S. official could not officially confirm the reports but said that the strikes had probably killed the man. The use of media as a tool of terror has become more common, but while criminals and terrorists can use technology to record and publicize their attacks, investigators can use the same tools to help prevent them

Forecast

• German conservatives’ criticism of what they perceive as Berlin’s soft approach to EU issues will not abate and will affect Germany’s foreign and domestic policies in 2016 and particularly after elections in 2017.
• Within two years, conservative and mildly Euroskeptic governments are likely to rule in Germany and France — the main economic and political players in Europe.
• Berlin and Paris will continue to have different ideas regarding the future of the European Union, but rather than debating on how to deepen continental integration, they will discuss how to reverse some aspects of integration to preserve the bloc.

Analysis

German Chancellor Angela Merkel is struggling to preserve the cohesion of the German government. The leaders of the three parties in power — Merkel’s conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU); its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU); and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) — met Oct. 31 but failed to reach consensus on measures to cope with the immigration crisis. However, after the meeting officially ended, Merkel and Bavarian President Horst Seehofer released a joint position paper calling for the creation of transit zones for migrants at the Germany-Austria border and the suspension of family reunification for certain groups of migrants. During a Nov. 5 meeting, the three parties replaced the idea of transit zones with a proposal to build new reception centers for immigrants and plans to make deportations faster.

These actions confirm that pressure from the Bavarian party is shaping Merkel’s reaction to the refugee crisis. They also show that Merkel thinks she can convince the SPD, which is against the creation of transit zones, to adopt a tougher stance on immigration. Neither the SPD nor the CSU is ready for early elections, so the continuity of the government is not in danger at this point. But the events of 2015 have shown the limitations of a grand coalition government in times of crisis and will push Germany’s main political forces to redefine their ideological positions before the general elections of 2017.

Two Crises in One Year

Berlin spent the first half of 2015 focusing on Greece, which got dangerously close to leaving the eurozone. During the second half of the year, Berlin had to deal with the immigration crisis as hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers moved across Europe trying to reach the wealthy economies in the north. These crises sparked revolts among conservative factions in the German government and created confusion among progressive factions.

When it comes to the European Union, Germany needs to keep the continental bloc alive, especially for its relationship with France. It also needs to protect its national wealth and prevent the European Union from becoming a transfer union in which wealthy economies in the north subsidize those in the south. Though most German politicians are interested in protecting both imperatives, the largest parties have different views of what is the best balance between the two.

In general, the CDU and the CSU tend to prioritize the protection of Germany’s national wealth and think that Berlin and its neighbors should focus on the establishment of strong rules to govern an increasingly complex European Union. The SPD agrees with this view, but it tends to be more willing to make concessions to other countries, especially those in the south, to ensure the European Union’s political viability. Finding the right balance becomes particularly hard when Germany is ruled by a grand coalition that includes the three parties.

In the early months of her third term, Merkel implemented many measures from the progressives’ agenda, including passing a minimum wage and lowering the age of retirement. The measures disoriented both camps. The progressives accused Merkel of using their agenda to boost her popularity. The conservatives warned she was moving too close to the center. During the Greek crisis, Merkel’s efforts to extract concessions from Greece without expelling it from the eurozone infuriated many conservative lawmakers. SPD members were also unable to choose between their natural tendency to accommodate a fellow center-left party (Greece’s Syriza) and most German voters’ desire to be tough on Athens.

The refugee crisis is creating similar problems. The CSU and several members of the CDU demand a tougher stance on asylum seekers, which explains Merkel’s recent policy shift. The SPD is trapped between its ideology, which tends to be sympathetic with asylum seekers, and the growing fear among voters that the German state is spending too many resources to deal with a migrant influx of a size that is still impossible to determine. In the meantime, Merkel’s image as an efficient problem solver has been damaged, maybe permanently.

Avoiding the ‘Die Linke’ Trap

As the next general elections approach, Germany’s main parties will try to more clearly define their positions after four years in a grand coalition. The conservatives’ main concern will be preventing the emergence of new electoral parties on the right. Other conservative parties have rarely competed with the CDU and the CSU. The closest these parties saw to competition was the Free Democratic Party, a small centrist party that formed government alliances with both the CDU and the SPD.

For the SPD, however, the situation is more complex, as disenchanted SPD voters express their anger at the party by turning to the left-wing Die Linke (The Left) or to the environmentalist party The Greens. Disenchanted CDU and CSU voters have little to choose from — or at least they did until the Euroskeptic Alternative for Germany emerged in 2013. The party, which was born as a sophisticated club of university professors campaigning against Germany’s membership in the eurozone, soon evolved into an anti-immigration party with a more traditional right-wing agenda. Alternative for Germany’s rebranding coincided with the anti-Islam Pegida group’s rise in popularity.

Germany’s history and political culture will prevent Alternative for Germany from entering a coalition government any time soon. However, the party will influence the country’s political debate far beyond what its current popularity (around 8 percent) suggests. As the Greek crisis — and especially the immigration crisis — shows, a combination of ideology and fear of losing votes to Alternative for Germany is pushing CDU and CSU politicians to adopt more nationalist and mildly Euroskeptic positions. Meanwhile, the SPD will have to decide between turning to the left and building a clearer identity, and jumping on the Euroskeptic bandwagon.

Repercussions for the European Union

In the coming years, Germany’s view of the European Union will probably resemble that of German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaueble, who sees it as a continental bloc that moves at multiple speeds, in which not every country is meant to reach the same level of political and financial integration and problematic members can be expelled. This view would keep several Central and Eastern European nations from entering the eurozone. Countries such as Poland and Hungary would probably agree with this approach; Warsaw and Budapest are not particularly enthusiastic about joining the common currency. Moreover, because crises in the eurozone periphery are far from over, the possibility of Greece and others leaving the euro cannot be ruled out.

Germany’s coming approach to Europe will probably also include small doses of the CSU’s view of a European Union where foundational principles such as the free movement of people could be suspended or reversed to protect national and regional interests. Germany’s new view could also have some elements of the SPD’s foreign policy agenda, which is based on cordial but distant ties with the United States and fluid energy and trade ties with Russia.

The transition will be slow and will not be fully felt until after elections in 2017. However, 2016 will offer some early signals of the change. To begin with, Germany will probably be more receptive to the United Kingdom’s request to protect the interests of non-eurozone countries, keep the EU budget under control and curtail immigrants’ access to welfare benefits. A full revision of the EU treaties is unlikely, but Berlin and London will work on ways to accommodate some of the United Kingdom’s requests. At the same time, Germany will resist France’s push for deeper financial integration, especially if it means creating separate budgets for the eurozone or a mechanism for fiscal transfers from northern Europe to the south.

In the short run, this will create friction between Berlin and Paris. However, it could be short-lived, because France will probably become more Euroskeptic after it holds its own general elections in 2017. The ruling Socialist party will struggle to make it to the second round of France’s presidential elections, which will probably end up pitting a moderately Euroskeptic center-right (especially if former President Nicolas Sarkozy defeats Alain Juppe to become the conservative candidate) against a ferociously anti-EU right (the National Front).

The next administration in Paris is likely to make two policy decisions that Berlin will support: defending tougher policies on immigrants and preventing new countries from joining the European Union and the eurozone. But a more nationalist government in France could also request the introduction of temporary exceptions in the free movement of goods in Europe to protect some sectors such as agriculture. This would be the ultimate red line for Germany, a nation that depends on exports to keep unemployment at tolerable levels.

Disagreements between France and Germany will not end with the elections in 2017, but the nature of the debate will change. Since the beginning of the economic crisis, the discussions between Paris and Berlin focused on how to deepen European integration to prevent new crises. This was controversial enough, because Berlin and Paris have different views on what the future integration should look like. However, starting in late 2017, the debate will begin focusing on how to reverse some aspects of continental integration to try to save the European Union.

Summary

Ukraine is likely to undergo a significant political shake-up after the ruling coalition’s main parties performed poorly in recent local elections. This overhaul likely will include a Cabinet reshuffle, the replacement of several key ministers, and a public campaign to crack down on corruption and, more specifically, on powerful oligarchs. The Western-oriented government led by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk will probably remain intact in the near term, but increasing pressures and growing political instability in Kiev will have important implications domestically and for Ukraine’s relationships with Russia and the West.

Analysis

Mayoral and city council seats were contested throughout most of Ukraine in elections on Oct. 25. Although official results will not be available until after Nov. 15, when some cities and regions hold runoff elections, the initial vote made it clear that Ukraine is still deeply a divided country. Regions in western and central Ukraine favor pro-Western parties, while eastern and southern regions show more support for the pro-Russian Opposition Bloc party. Notably, the major parties in Ukraine’s ruling coalition did not perform particularly well. The Poroshenko Bloc lost ground to other Western-oriented parties such as Samopomych, and the People’s Front party founded by Yatsenyuk in 2014 fared so badly in polls before the vote that it refrained from even participating in elections.

Poroshenko’s and Yatsenyuk’s parties dominated the most recent parliamentary elections, which were held in October 2014. But since then, Yatsenyuk’s popularity has eroded; recent polls show he has less than 5 percent of his own party’s support. He lost much of his base when he championed painful austerity measures to get financing from Western Institutions and prop up the ailing economy amid the conflict in Ukraine. Moreover, much of the population sees high-level corruption as pervasive and views the government as ineffective in areas such as judicial and legal reform. And as Yatsenyuk’s popularity has fallen, so has support for Poroshenko’s party. Today Poroshenko’s and Yatsenyuk’s parties collectively hold only 225 seats in the 450-seat parliament.

Recognizing that public support for the Ukrainian government is declining, Yatsenyuk pledged to enact a major political overhaul, including a reshuffling of the Cabinet, after the elections. The prime minister said he may replace ministers in such areas as energy, health care and education in as little as two weeks. At the same time, Poroshenko has launched a public anti-corruption campaign that included the arrest of Gennady Korban, an influential businessman linked to Ukrainian oligarch Igor Kolomoiski, on bribery charges. According to Poroshenko, the arrest was just the beginning of a broader crackdown on corruption. The president has promised a renewed emphasis on tackling graft in the country.

Although these measures are meant to revitalize support for the government, they put the ruling coalition at some risk. Oligarchs remains extremely influential in Ukrainian politics. Figures like Kolomoiski not only hold major stakes in the country’s banking and energy sector but also wield influence through volunteer battalions operating in eastern Ukraine. Pushing too hard against the oligarchs comes at a price; oligarchs Dmitri Firtash and Rinat Akhmetov withdrew their support from former President Viktor Yanukovich before his ouster in 2014. Poroshenko, himself one of Ukraine’s richest men, will have to proceed cautiously in targeting the more powerful oligarchs as part of his anti-corruption campaign.

Yatsenyuk’s position as prime minister is likely safe for now. Poroshenko has no other party he can work with to maintain a majority in parliament, and Yatsenyuk, as the force behind financial reform in Ukraine, has substantial support from the West. Yatsenyuk also plays a key role in Ukraine’s negotiations with the International Monetary Fund to receive the next tranche of its bailout before the end of the year. However, next year could prove more problematic for the prime minister. Members of his party may take the opportunity to join other Western-oriented parties — something that could lead to early elections or usher in a new prime minister in 2016.

The growing precariousness of the ruling coalition’s position is also likely to have important consequences for Ukraine’s relationship with Russia. The conflict in eastern Ukraine has calmed significantly since temporary cease-fire was established at the beginning of September, and both Ukrainian and separatist forces have begun withdrawing heavy weaponry from the line of contact in accordance with the Minsk agreement. However, following an uptick in fighting in recent days, Ukraine’s Security Council secretary has said that the country will suspend the armament withdrawal if the Russian-backed rebels continue their provocations and use of heavier weapons such as mortars.

Meanwhile, the government is considering delaying controversial constitutional reforms that would grant greater autonomy to the Donbas regions — a key demand by Russia and the separatists. If Kiev does delay the reforms until after the end of the year as it struggles to implement its domestic agenda, tensions with the separatists and Moscow may escalate.

The main theme for Europe in the fourth quarter will be a recurring one: fragmentation. Indeed, the next three months will bring political and even territorial fragmentation to the Continent. The European Union will be dealing with three main issues, the migration crisis and political developments in Spain and Greece.

Germany will be increasingly hemmed in by domestic factors. Pressure from conservative forces within her government will force Chancellor Angela Merkel to continually seek accommodation. This will be the case, for example, with the migration crisis. On the one hand, Germany will introduce reforms to make it easier for refugees to join the workforce. On the other hand, it will toughen its asylum policies to slow the flow of refugees to Germany

Conservative pressure will also be felt in Merkel’s handling of the Greek bailout. Berlin will give Greece’s new administration enough time to come up with a governing plan. However, Berlin will also push Athens to honor its bailout commitments and will be willing to delay the disbursement of money in the likely case the reforms calendar is not respected. Merkel’s position as chancellor is not under threat, but dissidents within her party will remain very vocal, forcing Merkel to seek the middle ground.

The Immigration Crisis

The arrival of asylum seekers will remain problematic for Europe during the quarter, but measures by EU members to enhance land and maritime controls and colder weather will temporarily reduce the influx of migrants into the Continent. During the quarter, Europe will focus its efforts on measures designed to prevent people from entering the Continent, especially by seeking to cooperate with countries in the Middle East and Africa.

However, European efforts to prevent migrants from reaching EU territory will have modest success. The European Union will provide more funds for countries in the Middle East and North Africa. This will only be modestly effective: In countries such as Libya, there is not a central government to negotiate with. The European Union’s naval operation in the Mediterranean Sea will start boarding, searching and seizing vessels in international waters. This will increase the chances of violent clashes between EU forces and human traffickers. In addition, money will not be enough to keep migrants in countries like Turkey or Lebanon, where asylum seekers find legal barriers to work.

Under pressure from conservative forces at home, Germany will toughen its position on asylum, trying to become less attractive for asylum seekers. Access to asylum benefits will be made harder while repatriations will be made easier for certain groups (especially migrants from the Western Balkans). Sporadic border controls will remain in place across the Continent aimed at disrupting migration routes.

The Greek Crisis

During the fourth quarter, the Greek government will introduce just enough measures to receive funds from its bailout program, but the entire schedule of reforms and disbursement of money will be delayed. Because of the general elections that were held in September, Athens postponed the approval of many of the reforms included in its bailout package. As a result, the creditors will probably delay their assessment of the bailout and the disbursements of money (both were originally scheduled for mid-October).

The creditors are likely to give Greek politicians some extra time to come up with a government program and a plan for reform. But several governments in Northern Europe, including Germany, the Netherlands and Finland, invested significant political capital in approving the Greek bailout and promised conservative lawmakers at home that they would keep constant pressure on Athens. This means that the lenders will have some patience with Greece, but pressure will return by the end of the year.

The delays in the reviews and disbursement of money will also delay the International Monetary Fund’s decision on whether to participate in the program. The Greek government will push for debt relief, but the creditors will not make any concrete moves. Talks on debt relief will start during the quarter but will probably not bear any fruit before the end of the year.

After making substantial debt payments to the European Central Bank in July and August, Greece faces a somewhat calmer calendar of debt maturities for the rest of the year. This means that Athens can probably survive a delay in the disbursement of bailout money. However, Greece is not out of the woods. The longer the implementation of the program is delayed, and the longer the disbursement of money is deferred, the greater the fear of a Grexit and the more political frictions within Germany are bound to escalate.

The Spanish Crisis

In Spain, the political effects of its economic crisis will be fully felt as secessionist sentiments continue to create problems between Madrid and Catalonia and as anti-establishment parties challenge the political establishment in the general elections.

In Catalonia, pro-independence forces will spend the first weeks of the quarter trying to form a government because the Together for Yes party, which won the election in September 27th , will need support from the small left-wing CUP party to appoint the next Catalan president.

Friction within the pro-independence parties will delay the secession process somewhat, and the next Catalan government will move cautiously: The Catalan parliament will probably approve a solemn declaration announcing the beginning of the independence process and will also announce plans to draft a constitution. However, political differences within the pro-independence camp will prevent Catalonia from making any drastic moves. The government in Madrid will turn to the Constitutional Court to block whatever measures it believes violate the Spanish Constitution.

At the national level, Spain will get ready for general elections on Dec. 20. After years of crisis, the two largest political parties (the People’s Party and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) are discredited and will probably not be strong enough to form a government alone. This will lead to a coalition government, potentially including newcomer parties such as Podemos and Ciudadanos. Considering that Spain has little experience with coalition governments, 2016 will be a year of political fragility, as the decision-making process will become considerably more complex.

Italy and France Dodge EU Sanctions 

The final quarter of the year will be eventful for Italy. Prime Minister Matteo Renzi will push ahead with his agenda of economic and institutional reform while trying to prevent a rebellion within his party and seeking to circumvent the EU Commission. Renzi will make progress in the process of constitutional reform because the Italian Senate will approve a plan to modify the composition and powers of the Senate with the goal of creating more stable governments.

The reform, however, will not be completed during the quarter; approval by the lower chamber and a popular referendum will only happen in 2016. The government in Rome will also introduce tax cuts for households when it presents its budget for 2016.

In France, the Socialist government will continue to make timid moves toward reform in the labor sector. Paris will enter negotiations with unions and businessmen to simplify labor regulations in early 2016. Like Rome, the government in Paris will also introduce tax cuts for households and seek to slow the pace of deficit reduction in its budget for next year. We expect the EU Commission to criticize Italy and France, but formal sanctions are unlikely — another illustration of Brussels’ increasingly politicized role in moderating the Continent’s economic affairs.

France will be particularly active in the Middle East as Paris continues its air campaign against the Islamic State in Syria. The Elysee is worried about being sidelined in negotiations over the future of Syria and will try to position itself alongside the United States as a counterbalance to Russia’s presence in the country. Paris will also seek to mediate the political stalemate between rival political factions in Lebanon when French President Francoise Hollande visits the country late in the quarter, though Paris lacks the weight to meaningfully influence Lebanese politics.

Political Change in the East and the North

The fourth quarter will be very important for the two largest countries in Central and Eastern Europe: Poland and Romania. Poland will hold general elections in October that could result in the defeat of its business-friendly government. Should the nationalist opposition take over, it will try to reverse some of the policies implemented by the previous administration. It could, for example, announce higher taxes for the banking sector and lower the retirement age. Domestic political changes will not, however, substantially modify Poland’s Foreign Policy, which will continue to be based on EU and NATO membership and a tough stance on Russia.

Romania will also face political turmoil during the quarter. Prime Minister Victor Ponta will be under pressure from the opposition to resign, and he will struggle to find support from his own party. But as with Poland, political frictions in Romania will not affect the country’s foreign policy priorities, which involve keeping close ties with the United States and NATO. While political developments may prevent Poland and Romania from making any substantial progress in their bilateral relationship, Warsaw and Bucharest will remain interested in developing closer bilateral ties.

The fourth quarter will also feature the growing debate in Sweden and Finland over the issue of NATO membership. The threat of Russian aggression has prompted leaders in both countries to consider joining the military alliance, with which they already have close ties. While public opinion in Sweden is slowly starting to favor NATO accession, Stockholm will not act without Helsinki on board. Considering that the Finnish government is currently focus on the on-going economic crisis.      Helsinki will be willing to discuss NATO membership but not to make any concrete moves during the quarter.

Climate Change Commitments 

During the fourth quarter, more than 190 countries will send delegates to Paris for the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in hopes of signing a legally binding deal on environmental standards and emissions targets designed to combat the effects of climate change. Although this will likely be the biggest global climate change deal since the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, it will still remain weak on enforcement, and developing countries will try to make sure emissions targets do not hinder economic development.

The United States and especially the European Union have opted for more aggressive measures targeting climate change. The European Union has outlined a target to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent from 1990 levels by 2030. The United States has set out a target of 26 percent to 28 percent by 2030 from 2005 levels. Most developing countries have chosen to establish targets on emissions intensity — emissions levels per unit of GDP — instead of targeting overall emission levels. The 2015 Paris summit will lead to some sort of an agreement in December, but it is still an open question whether it will obtain enough votes, particularly from the United States and China, for ratification to be legally binding, as Paris and Brussels hope.