Young Diplomats

Saudi Arabia has launched on the night of Wednesday to Thursday a military operation in Yemen, called “firmness Storm”. What are the reasons for which Riyadh has launched this intervention, with which partners and what form does it take?

Why Riyadh intervenes in Yemen?

In recent weeks, the crisis escalated: the Shiite militia Houthis -which has seized the capital and power since September- conducted quick advance in the direction of Aden, prompting President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, recognized by the international community and supported by the Sunni Saudi Arabia, to call for foreign military intervention.

Riyadh sees in  this crisis one more sign of the attempt of Iran -Shiite- to regain control over the region (although Tehran has denied any role in the crisis), while its influence is already growing in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, and within the Shiite protests in Bahrain. In addition, Saudi Arabia had to act to prevent the strategic Strait of Bab al-Mandeb, between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden,  to passes under the control of the Houthis. Riyadh also argues that the Houthi militia “control or could control ballistic missiles, heavy weapons and an air force.”

Who is involved?

This military operation involves “more than 10 countries,” according to Riyadh. Among them, all the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates) except Oman. The Saudis have announced that Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Pakistan –Strategic Allies of Riyad – but also Sudan – a traditional ally of Iran-volunteered.

Jordan and Egypt have confirmed their participation, unlike Morocco, which only expressed his “support”, and Pakistan, who is reviewing the application to take part in the coalition. Moreover, the United States, Yemeni President Hadi’s  allies in the fight against the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) announced providing support in logistics and intelligence.

What form does it take?

Saudi Arabia has massed forces (anti-aircraft systems, artillery, …) on its border with Yemen, before launching its warplanes to bomb several positions held by the Houthis in the capital Sanaa but also Al-Anad in the south of the country. According to Al-Arabiya, Ryad mobilized 150,000 soldiers and 10 fighters jets while the United Arab Emirates pledged 30 warplanes, Bahrain and Kuwait 15 aircraft each, Qatar 10. Jordan say it will engage 6 aircrafts.

In addition, four Egyptian warships entered Thursday in the Suez Canal en route to the Gulf of Aden, strategically important because of its location in the south of the Red Sea, and that they will “protect”. A Jordanian official source, however, refused to comment on media reports about a possible ground invasion.

How is it perceived?

Iran has of course condemned the military operation, saying it was “losing the chances of a peaceful resolution of internal differences in Yemen.” Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, denounced a “dangerous step” that will only ” cause more death,” “will create more tension in the region and will bring no benefit to any country.” He added that the operation was likely to make the game of AQAP jihadists and Islamic State group, which has claimed its first attack in Yemen, which cause more than 140 casualties Friday in mosques in Sana’a.[trx_googlemap address=”Sana’a Yemen” zoom=”16″ style=”default” width=”100%” height=”240″]

The progress of Houthis rebel troops  toward the city of Aden in the south of Yemen , has definitely plunged the country in a civil war , fueled by the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with the Islamic State  as a new disruptive agent.

Yemen is experiencing a chaotic situation for many months and the situation is getting worse. Wednesday , March 25 , Houthis rebel troops which are installed in the capital Sana’a, were pursuing their advance toward the south and the city of Aden , where the legitimate president Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi was exfiltrated. Aerials raid were taking place against the presidential palace.

The Houthis , have also seized after limited fighting , the air base of Al-Anad , deserted since last week by US troops stationed there. Which now puts them at least thirty kilometers of Aden.

However , since the very deadly attacks into two Shiites mosques in Sana’a last week, Yemen has to deal with a new disruptive agent , the organization of the Islamic State (IS), which claimed the attacks.

YoungDiplomats sum up what is actually at stake in Yemen

The struggle between Houthis and President Hadi.

Since former president of Yemen , Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to give up his seat in 2012, the current president recognized by the United Nations , Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi , under pressure from the Houthis , a Shia Zaidi located at the North of the country , close to the Saudi Border. The rise of the Houthis , who took the capital Sanaa in September and are now moving towards the South , where has fled the president Hadi, is notably supported by the former President Saleh. Far from having given up on the power , the latter plays a game disorder through its networks within the army, many of whom have remained loyal.

“The advance of Houthis to the south suggests that the President does not possess important military forces loyal to him. There is also a high probability according to many experts interviewed by YoungDiplomats , that an important part of the Army joined the Houthis side. The reasons for that is that the army was already largely under the control of former president Saleh , and from the moment he decided to support the Houthi movement, he brought with him the majority of the army. A good example of that is that  we saw an aerial bombing of presidential palace by the Houthis , however all the airforce is supposed to be detained by Yemen’s Army.

But by pushing his personal interests , the former president Saleh added a religious dimension to his struggle between Zaidi Shiite Houthis and President Hadi , a Sunni, like the majority of its population. “ While the religious issue was not from first importance in Yemen , it has gradually become so, . since the transition and since Ali Abdullah Saleh has rediscovered its Zaidi identity.  Saleh played a dangerous game since the end of 2012 , and now Yemen found himself in the middle of a polarization that did not exist until now, and this polarization is now fueled by foreign actors , that see in divided Yemen , a good way to expand their sphere of influence.

Saudi Arabia, Iran , and the regional leadership

The fragility of Yemen’s government has indeed fueled the tensions and allowed Saudi Arabia and Iran to exercise on a new playground their regional rivalry. If former President Saleh has tried to take advantage of the sectarian issue, the confrontation , less and less discrete between the Saudis and Iranian, Sunnis and Shiites powers, on Yemeni soil was indeed placed at the center of the chessboard.

In the background there are two powers that emerge and are in a shadow war : Saudi Arabia , which supports the legitimate president Hadi refuge in Aden , then Shiite Iran , which supports the Houthis minority that is becoming more and more powerful in the North of Yemen , close to the Saudi border.  Saudis are afraid that these Houthis became an Iranian proxy-such as Hezbollah in Lebanon- that could potentially endanger the Security of the Saudi Kingdom. Now it is clear that it is potentially devastating because it covers the regional conflict between Sunni and Shiites.

For Iran , it is to extend its influence. For a week there are 14 aircrafts per day ranging from Tehran to Sana’a while where is not normally a regular connection between these two cities , according to latest reports. Iran came into play by taking advantage of the situation and is in the process of forming a base that will look like its bases in Southern Lebanon.

But the most important point is of course the Strait of Bad el-Mandeb , where the bulk of word trade passes and much of the oil , before returning to the Suez Canal and Europe. This strait is strategic and is clearly at the heart of Iran’s maritime ambitions to settle in the region to show that they are not only confined to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Iran could therefore have two straits , thus becoming an essential partner for the world.

But the Saudi Kingdom has no intention of leaving Tehran advance its objectives. Saudi Arabia has always considered that the security situation in Yemen was a Saudi internal affair. The Saudis have already massed troops on the border, and started aerial bombing of Houthis positions in Sana’a the 26^th of March 2015. They are ready for a border confrontation , knowing that in the other side of the border,  it is a Houthi stronghold.

Expansion of the Islamic State

To these internal and external tensions , there is also now the threat of the organization of the Islamic State. By hitting spectacularly , Friday 20^th of March , Shiites mosques of Sana’a , the Islamic State informed the world that after Ira, Syria and Libya, Yemen were becoming a new objective.

There was an aggregation that is operating slowly but surely in many territories, both in the Maghreb and in the Mashrik. We saw it in the events that happened in Tunisia , and also in Libya, where slowly but surely an Islamic terror is taking place, we see it in Libya, where the Islamic State already took over the 100k city of Dernaa. Somehow , Yemen is fast becoming a Libya bis”. In both cases , it’s failed states. This is extremely worrying for regional security and even internationally.

In Yemen, the Islamic State can rely on the frustration of the Sunni population , the majority in Yemen , which is angry against the takeover of Sana’a by the Houthis. The objectives of the organization of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi is to annihilate the Zaidi Shiites , where the Houthis are coming from, while in the same time avoiding President Hadi to come back in power.

The choice of Yemen for Daesh is also highly symbolic vis-à-vis his rival. Indeed, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsulat (AQAP) is indeed the most active branch of Al-Qaida and has been significantly weakened in recent months by drone attacks by the United States. But surprisingly , there is a stimulating competition. These two terrorists groups are on two different records that do not vanish. One is traditionally attacking the West, the far enemy, while the other one goal is to expand its grip on the region”.

The country has practically entered into a civil war. Since the intervention of Saudi Arabia today , we can officially talk about a civil war. Yemen is  trapped into a vicious circle , and it is very hard to predict how they could get out of it. This is in the same time a civil war and a proxy war. These are two wars that fit into each other and give a totally chaotic configuration.

In a context of extreme tensions, both on the domestic scene and on the international stage, the Russian society is in shock, following the death of Boris Netmstov. To analyse the consequences for Russia YoungDiplomats scanned the reactions of the Moscovite press.

The Assassination on the night of 28^th Feburary, on a bridge in central Moscow, of the Kremlin’s opponent Boris Nemstov, 55, triggered an intense emotion in Russia. The day after the assassination , every newspapers ranging from the gouvernemental ones such as Rossiiskaia Gazera, to the most liberal ones such as Novaia Gazeta, put the murder of Nemtsov in the headlines of their newspapers. These was follows by mourning marches all across the capital and many cities of the Russian Federation.

Virtually , the entire assembly of the political spectrum expressed their stupor and their strong and indeniable condemnation of violence and crime , and personalities from all sides of political spectrum, lamended the loss of a man universally recognized as an extraordinary politician. They emphasized the fighting spirit and the perseverance, that he displayed since the beginning of his political career in the beginning of the 90’s , as a young governor of the region of Nizhny Novgorod and as a deputy prime minister under the presidency of Boris Yelstin ,the one of a liberal democracy-loving.

Yelstin even thought as him as his possible successor.

According to the chronichor of the popular daily Moskovsky Komsomolets, Mikhael Rostovsky, Netmstvo had never forgotten Yelstin’s words about “ the possibility to make him his heir”, and about Putin, which was considered “ as a kind of usurper “ for which he felt a certain jealousy”.

The simple mandate elect of the Yaroslavl region he had at the time of his assassination made us forget that he had almost reach the supreme power in his youth. Indeed  , as recalled by Moskovsky Komsomolets, “ it is now evolving on the outskirts of Russian political life, and was unlikely to return to the center”. However , no one in the country , had forgotten “his rebellious character , passionate and generous”.

Political Assassination

Russian liberal right is no longer represented in the Duma (Russian Parliament) since a long time, but it continues its political existence. At the head of the RPR- Parnas party and as a member of the Coordinating Council of the Russian opposition, Boris Nemtsov was implicated in all the protests acriss the country, and was repeatedly abused and even arrested by the authorities. Did it mean he felt his life was threatened?

The  opposition newspaper Novai Gazeta  believe so and published the same interview he granted in April 2014. “ I know they can kill me , he said it but they can not force me to shut up”. An Interview presented by the title as a “ testament”

“They” Killed him, but with what consequences for the country?  Questions the press. Whatever the reasons for this, this is “ a political assassination for the simple reason that Nemtsov was a political player in the opposition,” said the Nezavisimaya Gazeta. And Russian power is put on notice by the outside world “ to demonstrate that he is wrong when he questions the Moscow ability to conduct a proper investigation” A logical doubt, say the title. And not only because of the war of information that is taking place in Russian and in Western Europe around the Ukrainian Conflict , but also  because the Russian opposition is receiving heavy blows this last months from the Putin’s Government. “ how can we not see this murder as a logical step in the government logic, after condemening and throwing to jail other famous opponents such as Alexei Navalny and Serguei Oudalstov?”

An Attempt to destabilize the country

Nevertheless, the consequences will be severe. According to the newspaper Kommersant, “ the majority of political believe that the murder of Brois Nemstov is an attempt to destabilize the country”.  The pists that the investigation is covering cover an extremely large spectrum, according to the magazine the Kremlin Expert. They range from the support of Nemtsov to Charlie Hebdo, to his criticisms toward the Chechnyen leader Ramzan Kdyrov, to its implications in the Ukrainian conflict (because of his links to the Ukrainian President Petro Porochenko, but also because of its contacts with the Russians Separatists). According to the polititologue Evgueni Minchenko , quoted by the title, the Kremly did not for his part , had an interest in the death of Nemtsov , “because , for the Kremlin , Nemtsov was an opposition figure comprenhensible and comfortable , who choose legal ways to expose his point of views compared to his colleagues”.

“By depriving opposition of its leaders , the central power is putting himself in a difficult situation , is claiming the expert Nikolay Petrov quoted by Lanezavissimai Gazeta, because in case of confrontation , there might be no negociators, as Nemtsov could have been. And this would have created a situation of chas in case of heavy protests “. “ The first reactions of the power and of the political elite , measured and rational , give hope in the reducation of the degree of hatred and violence that was widespread in the Russian Society in recent times , is claiming the expert Igor Bounine in the same newspaper. And if this paradigm change , even a little, we could hope for an evolution of the political system, but this depends on only one person”.

The Agreement between Eurogroup and Greece summed up in 5 points :

Friday evening , the Eurogroup and Athena found an agreement which entails the prolongation of the support program until June, under the condition that Alexis Tsipras presents new measures on Monday. Explanations in 5 points 

• Germany got what it wanted… for now

“These last weeks , Germany insisted on the fact that she will not abandon the support program for Greece” recalls the Wall Street Journal. While the Greek Prime Minister , was first against the prolongation of this plan , he finally asked for an extension – which will last until June- and promised that he will respect the conditions.

• Athena should benefits from a greater indulgence

The Eurogroup will grant Greece a greater flexibility to attain its fiscal targets in 2015. Moreover ,   the Agreement does not impose to Athena to respect these same objectives for the following years. This aspect , was one of the will of Alexis Tsipras.

• The Agreement could collapse.

Monday, Athena would have to present to the Eurogroup , a list of reforms to respect the balance of its public finance. These reforms should be more or less similar to the one that the previous government engaged himself to pursue. Alexis Tsipras already announced that he wanted to cancel or modify some of those reforms, and among those reforms , the one he rejects totally is the one concerning the diminution of retirement pensions, which is one considered vital by the Eurogroup.

• Greek politicians could reject the Agreement

It seems that the agreement is conflicting with certain campaign promises of the Greek Prime Minister. With this agreement , Greece would indeed stay under the surveillance of the European Comission , of the IMF and of the European Central Bank , contrary to one of the major promise of Alexis Tsipras during his campaign.

• Greece will need more money

Given the fact that the Greek fiscal surplus , should be lower than expected in the coming years, Athena will need money. The Eurozone already announced that they were ready to reduce the interests rate of the funds they granted to Greece, but this will probably not be enough.

Ahmed Meiloud, researcher with Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts

Although the Islamic State (IS) remains enigmatic, its past comportment gives an indication of what it would try in the near future. IS’s next move inside Iraq depends on its ability to garner the support of the other Sunni groups, with which it currently shares the goal of toppling Maliki.  Coordination between these forces to capture towns outside Baghdad has so far been mutually rewarding. But this honeymoon may not last. If IS takes its supra-national commitment seriously, and if – as a consequence – it fails to assuage the concerns of nationalist groups, such as the Men of Naqshabandiyya, then a coordinated attack on Baghdad may not be feasible.

In this case, the group’s short-term plan would be to defend its possessions in Iraq and focus on Syria, where it would play the tactic that is has so far mastered: watching the two sides bleed each other and moving in at the right moment to take the spoil. IS may also plan one or two high profile attacks on the Syrian army installations to dispel the rumour that it is supported by Assad. Simultaneously, it may carry out attacks against KSA through its branch in the Arabian peninsular. Of course, an American-Iranian (Saudi-backed) intervention would complicate the calculus of Iraqi Sunni groups and IS’s as well. In that case, IS would gain the PR campaign it has so far lost, even if it is forced at the same time to give up the Caliphate and return to the pickup trucks and low-scale jihad.

Christopher Davidson, Reader in Middle East Politics and Fellow at Durham University, and author of After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies 

Seeking ever rising legitimacy along with increased recruitment and donations, IS’ leadership seems well aware that their movement needs to keep securing territory and notching up new victories.  Although likely better at it than their opponents, the movement is thus unlikely to want to get bogged down in lengthy, stalemate urban battles.  Instead it may keep a preference for the blitzkreig-like battles they have been so successful with over the past few months.  In this light, although most of IS’ main targets thus far have supposedly been the Shia-dominated, Iran-aligned ‘resistance axis’ governments of Assad and Maliki, IS may well accept that the respective heartlands around Damascus and Baghdad will be difficult and costly conquests, not least because Baghdad would see IS pitted against battle-tested Shia militias, rather than the quick-to-concede regular Iraqi army.  Thus, while these Shia ‘rump states’ will likely remain on the books as official IS targets, it’s likely that its leadership will also concentrate on other, ‘easy’ territories – namely those with sympathetic local Sunni populations and militias ready to facilitate ISIS occupation, and eventually those with IS-friendly internal ‘fifth columns’ that can be expected to rise up within cities when IS’ ‘army’ reach their borders.

Sami Ramadani, Iraqi-born sociology lecturer, writer on Iraq and Middle East current affairs and steering committee member of Stop the War Coalition

The rise of IS and other violently sectarian organisations in the Middle East is one of the bloody consequences of many interrelated factors.

First, arming and training Bin Laden and Taliban forces in Afghanistan/Pakistan in the 1980’s. Second, the 2001 US-led invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Third, the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, which led to the destruction of the country’s state and social institutions and the emergence of terrorist organisations. The US operated death squads and formed six secret militias to fight the resistance in Iraq. Fourth, the NATO bombing of Libya and support for former Guantanamo detainees and militias there. Fifth, the NATO members’ and Gulf rulers’ arming and funding of Syrian armed sectarian organisations through NATO’s Turkey. Qatar alone spent $3 billion within two years (2011-13). Sixth, the US, Saudi and Qatari efforts to isolate and encircle Iran through a sectarian propaganda war since the 1979 Iranian revolution. Seventh, a largesse of countless billions of petrodollars expended by the Saudi and Qatari ruling Wahhabi families, over many decades, to spread the violently sectarian Wahhabi cult throughout the Muslim world and Europe. Eighth, the emergence of an alliance, at least de facto and temporary, in Iraq between ISIS, Barzani’s powerful Kurdish militias and former Saddamist officers and the Ba’ath party, led by Saddam’s former deputy, Izzet al-Douri.

The vast majority on Sunni Muslims reject the Wahhabi cult, which goes against the traditions of nearly all Muslim countries. In Iraq in the 1920’s Shia and Sunni leading clergy united to expel Wahhabis coming into Iraq from the Arabian peninsula.

What possible outcome for the Syrian Civil War

• More likely the country will break up in parts , Kurdish in the North, Alawite on the Coast, Sunni in the Middle. This will have the inconvenient to break the Shiites axis.
• Also another implication will be that this would be the first step to the creation for an autonomous Kurdish State
• Second hypothesis : there is a stalemate and nobody wins, the situation continues for dozens of years until someone break up (most likely the Alawites Forces) in this case there will be for sure a phenomenon of somalization and breaking up in pars.
• Second hypothesis, The Assad regime destroys all resistance after years of fierce fighting. Thanks to the continual supply of arms and heavy weapons from Iran and Russian , and thanks for getting under the Iranian Nuclear Umbrella, any foreign intervention in Syria became impossible. Islamic State was defeated by a Western coalition,  therefore the regime just had to focus on AL Nusra front, after fierce fighting they defeated them, and deafeated the Free Syrian army factions was easy given their larck of unity and coordination. The country is devastated , the population demoralized, the ex rebels and their family on the run or keeping a low profile. Bashar is the new master of the country. The axis with Iran is reformed , the Islamist of Al Nusra and Islamic States flee to their homeland or to the neighboring countries , feeding instability in Lebanon and fierce fighting oppose Hezbollah to these Sunni Islamist, Lebanon is on the brink on a Civil War again.
• Third hypothesis , the ongoing EU sanctions on Russian and Iran affect these countries abilities to supply weapons and resources to Al Assad Army. The Price of oil who went up again gave Gulf countries more latitude to supply the Rebels. Slowly and slowly the Rebels are gaining ground in the periphery, in Alep First, where an Islamic Front combined of Islamic State,Al Nusra gain the control of the city after months of fierce fighting , the loyal army , on the run , because of the lack of ammunition. Then the Rebels instead of attacking big cities cut the road between Lattaquie and Damascus , the Army regime is cut in 2 , and without proper support they loose the battle. Bashar Al Assad is killed during a public apparition by a kamikaze explosion. Few days after , an important Shiite leader met the representants of the main Islamic Rebels factions to negotiate an agreement concerning the fate of the Alawis remaining on the coastline. An Agreement is found , and few days after , a National Transition Council funded by Qatar and Saudi Arabia , take place, the Free Syrian Army which saw most of its fighters rally Al Nusra or other Islamic factions during the war , is not part of it. Sharia is declared, and the Islamic Republic of Al Shams is born. However , there is internatl fighting growing and growing in the North , between the Islamic State, well implanted in Raqqa , and the Al Nusra Front which control the rest of Syria. The Alawites keeps a low profile, and do have to pay the Jizrya , the taxes for the minorities , and their surviving is only due because Iran is threating to intervene militarilu in the Islamic Republic of Al Shams if any harm is done to the Shiia Syrians.

In Any cases , the lack of Unitiy of the Rebels and their extreme disparity, will cause evidently a clash sooner or later , especially between the secular pro-democracy, western backed, Free Syrian Army , and the Islamic front composed of Al Nusra and the Islmic State , whom their goal is to install a regime based on Sharia.

However the regime also do have a weakness. Its weakness is that it is entirely based on the image of Bashar Al Assad , if Al Assad dies, there will be a huge demotivation in the loyalist forces , and it is likely that their will be fighting to know whom its successor is.

However the most important factor , would be to know how foreign nations will continue to support their side. Will Iran,Hezbillah and Russia continue to aid forever Syria? Will the FSA  receive serious backing from the US or any western countries? Will the Gulf States pursue their financial backing of the Islamist Rebels. Who will blink first?

Also it is really important , that whatever the outcome is , the presence of many Islamist, a lot of them foreigners , combat-experienced , will probably provokes regional instability across the region , especially in Lebanon.

On Sunday, Recep Tayyip Erdogan , Turkey’s longest- ruling prime minister, won the country’s first direct presidential election. He will now change hats, moving from one executive position to another, but will keep his place as the most powerful man in Turkey.

For over a decade, the United States and Europe have viewed Turkey as a model for other Muslim-majority nations. For many, Mr. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, known by the initials A.K.P., seemed to affirm that an Islamist polity could also be democratic. But this line of thinking was mistaken.

Throughout his tenure, Mr. Erdogan has governed in an increasingly authoritarian manner. The A.K.P. has used democracy as a vehicle to consolidate power, rather than as a system of checks and balances to protect political and ethnic minorities. Mr. Erdogan’s government has made a habit of quashing any opposition, most prominently during the 2013 Gezi Park protests where the police used tear gas and water cannons on demonstrators.

And despite Mr. Erdogan’s victory in Sunday’s vote, his era may actually be coming to an end. Just as he once rode to power on a wave of conservative Islamist sentiment as formerly marginalized Turks found their political voice, the next great wave in Turkish politics will be a liberal one. Even after dominating the airwaves during the campaign, Mr. Erdogan eked out only 52 percent of the vote, a similar result to his past victories. His support appears to have peaked.

Mr. Erdogan cut his political teeth in the 1980s within Turkey’s Islamist Welfare Party, also known as the S.P., when it was a lonely opposition voice in a staunchly secular state. When I lived in Turkey in the 1990s, the future had Mr. Erdogan written all over it, even if he was then a political unknown and the S.P. was only a marginal party. He rose to prominence because the party led a grassroots political movement promising to make Turkey a more just place for the pious underclass. At that time, Turkey was poor, and the dream of a fair society, sold by door-knocking S.P. activists, appealed to the masses. Islamists represented the future. In 1995, Mr. Erdogan was elected Istanbul’s mayor, and in 2002, he became the country’s first Islamist prime minister.

Once in power, Mr. Erdogan resorted to anti-elitist rhetoric to boost his support, using his underdog image to attack his critics. He targeted his secular opponents first, with assistance from the conservative Gulen movement. Alleging that these groups were about to carry out a coup, he locked up hundreds of military officers, and used the incident to justify imprisoning scholars, secular politicians, and journalists. Even though the prosecutors could not produce a full and convincing account of the supposed plot, Mr. Erdogan acted pre-emptively against his opponents. The paradox of employing authoritarianism to protect democracy went unnoticed in Washington and Brussels.

Last year he went after the Gezi Park protesters, charging them with running a vast conspiracy against him with assistance from Europeans and the “interest-rate lobby,” a thinly veiled reference to Jews. The police used tear gas and water cannons to disperse millions of Turks who took part in these anti-government rallies.

Finally, he went after his allies. In December 2013, when Gulen-affiliated prosecutors pressed corruption charges against him and other A.K.P. officials, Mr. Erdogan employed his signature tactic. He made the movement his new political piñata, accusing the Gulenists of conspiring with the United States to overthrow him.

The narrative of victimization that Mr. Erdogan has deployed since his days in the opposition, combined with Turkey’s undeniable economic success, has created an untouchable cult of personality. All three branches of government in Turkey are now firmly in his hands.

But a problem awaits President Erdogan: Turkey is nearly evenly split; on Sunday 48 percent of Turks did not vote for him. And Mr. Erdogan cannot rely on growing popular support. In the 2011 parliamentary elections, his party received 21.5 million votes. In March’s nationwide local polls, it got 20.5 million votes and on Sunday, Mr. Erdogan was able to collect 20.7 million votes. He and his party have plateaued.

This is because the A.K.P. no longer represents the future of Turkey. True, Mr. Erdogan has transformed the country economically — the Turks are not poor anymore — but he also rules with an iron grip, and Turks increasingly want a free society. Moving forward, Mr. Erdogan’s biggest challenger will be the amorphous liberal movement that led the Gezi Park protests.

Today, Turkey’s future has liberalism written all over it. Just as the Islamists came from the fringes in the 1990s after years in the political wilderness under strictly secular Kemalist rule, a new generation of liberals is emerging as a grassroots movement, using the power of social media to sell their own dream: a truly democratic Turkey.

The liberals do not yet have a charismatic leader or a party to bring them to power, as Mr. Erdogan and the S.P. eventually did for Islamists in the 1990s. The country’s opposition, the Republican People’s Party, or C.H.P., is a mix of secularists and die-hard leftists. It needs to undergo a metamorphosis to become a real force. And although the Kurdish-led People’s Democratic Party, or H.D.P., has promoted a decidedly liberal message and increased its share of the national vote from 5 to almost 10 percent, it’s still a small party and having violent Kurdish nationalists among its ranks won’t help win broader support.

Turkey’s future liberal movement will have to bring together liberal Kurdish nationalists and liberal secular Turks. Its leader is yet to emerge. But the energy and ideology are there, and he or she will one day step forward to transform Turkish politics the same way Mr. Erdogan revolutionized the country after surfacing from the youth branch of his party.

He will go down in history as the leader who transformed Turkey economically, but the liberals will transform it politically

As ISIS keeps advancing on the ground in Iraq, the hardline jihadi militants have revived with a vengeance one of the oldest conflicts there is: the rift between the Sunnis and Shiites in Islam.

Iraq is a perfect ground for the divide to turn violent: it has a Shia-majority population, a Shia-led government under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and an embattled Sunni minority, which dominated the country for centuries, from the Ottoman Empire until the U.S. invasion deposed Saddam Hussein in 2003.

“The Iraq conflict plays out on several levels between Sunnis and Shiites. First and foremost, it’s about how to share power in a 21st century state. The prime minister, a Shiite, has failed abysmally in creating a formula to share power with the Sunnis, the traditional political masters in Iraq,” Robin Wright, a joint fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Woodrow Wilson Center, non-partisan institutions, told NBC News.

The divide between the two major branches of Islam has lasted for centuries — and the schism is not always just a religious one. It began when the Prophet Muhammad died in 632 A.D. and a clash erupted over who should succeed him. One side, which became the Shiites, believed Muhammad’s successor should be someone from his bloodline; those who spawned the Sunnis held it could be a pious individual who could follow Muhammad’s customs. The rift has divided the Muslim landscape across the Middle East and beyond for 1,350 years, with some countries being controlled by Shiites and the others by Sunnis, and shifting back and forth.

While the two sects may disagree over the politics of succession, they share many of the same beliefs. Both read the Quran as the Word of God, believe in the sayings of the Prophet and follow the Five Pillars of Islam. Their prayer rituals are nearly identical — for instance Shiites will stand with their hands at their sides, Sunnis will put their hands on their stomachs. Both sides also believe in Islamic law, but have different ways of interpreting and enforcing it.

The large majority of the world’s Muslims are Sunni. Shiites are concentrated in Iran, southern Iraq and southern Lebanon, with significant communities in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

The Iranian Revolution in 1979 was a turning point in the Sunni-Shiite conflict, creating a radical Shiite theocracy in a large, oil-rich and well-armed nation. While the Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolution’s inspiration and Iran’s supreme leader, tried to build bridges between the two sects, other religious and secular leaders advanced the divide. Today, Iranian Sunnis do not have a mosque of their own, they do not hold top government posts, and Sunni businessmen have difficulties obtaining import and export licenses.

In Saudi Arabia, it’s the opposite. Sunnis are in power, with Shiites being the target of discrimination. Most Shia holy places in the kingdom have been destroyed by the Saudi royal family. A particularly rabid brand of local Sunni fundamentalism entwined with the state, known as Wahhabism, places severe restrictions on Shia practices, with some leaders being jailed.

While there’s a history of violence between the two groups, there were periods where they lived peacefully together for centuries. Today’s fighting in Iraq stems from a political power struggle.

There, Sunnis are a minority of the population, concentrated in the north and west. Since the end of World War I and the creation of Iraq by the British from the defeated Ottoman Empire, Sunnis have controlled Iraqi politics, often brutally. In 2003, when the U.S. invaded Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s Sunni regime was toppled and Shiites took power.

Three years later, Maliki, a Shiite allied with Iran, became the country’s new leader. Rather than seeking peace between the two groups, critics say he oppressed the Sunnis both inside government and by squashing protests in the streets. Today, ISIS militants from neighboring Syria have crossed the border into Iraq and have taken advantage of the discontent among the nation’s Sunni population. After the U.S. withdrew its forces in 2011, the Iraqi army it trained — which is itself divided along sectarian lines and is largely Shia — proved unable to fight the Sunni militants and has in fact fled before their advance.

“Sunnis have always held power in Iraq in significant quantities,” Haider Ala Hamoudi, an associate professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, told NBC News. “Over the course of decades, through a series of revolutions, the decision to exclude Shia became much more conscious. They were feared as a group that could somehow sell the country to Iran. The exclusion of the Shia was not something that was just a historical accident, but was viewed as something that was important to preserve the state in its current form.”

In other parts of the Arab world, relative peace has prevailed between the two sects. In 1959, al-Azhar University in Cairo, the world’s most influential center of Sunni scholarship, admitted Shia jurisprudence to its curriculum. In Azerbaijan, where the Shias are in the majority, there are mixed mosques where both sects pray together.

But tensions are on the rise in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Kuwait, Lebanon, Bahrain, Libya, Tunisia, Malaysia and Egypt. The growing concern is the possibility of a transnational civil war between Sunni and Shias where countries are divided along sectarian lines.

A collapse of states in the Middle East could follow, Olivier Roy, a history professor at the European University Institute in Italy, told New Republic. Iraq might lose Kurdistan, and Syria might collapse next: “The collapse of the existing nation-states will in turn weaken the international borders, even if they are not redrawn. The border between Iran and Iraq and the border between Turkey and its southern neighbors will be de facto open. Goods, people, and weapons will move more easily.”

As for Iraq, even Maliki’s top aide in charge of reconciliation told the New York Times that it may be fruitless to try and resolve the conflict now.

“Now there’s a war, there’s not reconciliation,” Amir al-Khuzai said. “With whom do we reconcile?”

Vladimir Putin has a very clear strategy in Ukraine: first, sow panic among Ukrainians and the West and then wait, then provoke Ukrainians into doing things that distance them from the West, and then wait; invade when both Ukrainians and the West are off balance; and then repeat the process.

Such a strategy, one could almost call it a recipe given its invariability, reflects three unfortunate facts: First, Putin has a longer time horizon than do either Ukrainians or Western governments. He doesn’t have to achieve all his goals all at once, whereas they want a resolution extremely quickly. By sowing panic, he is promoting his program.

Second, Putin understands that if he can provoke some Ukrainians into statements or actions that put distance between Kyiv and the West, he makes progress toward his goal of subordinating Ukraine and ultimately the rest of the former Soviet space and perhaps more to his will.

This tactic works either if Ukrainians call wolf once too often by predicting an invasion that doesn’t happen, thus leading Western governments to conclude that Ukrainian predictions are not to be trusted and can be dismissed even when they ultimately prove true, or if Putin’s offensiveness prompts some Ukrainians to say and do things that some in the West, to the applause of Putin’s clique, will invoke as more reasons not to support Ukraine.

And third, Putin knows even if some in Ukraine and elsewhere do not that sowing panic and provoking Ukrainians are an alternative to invasion but rather part and parcel of such a plan. Not only do these tactics make an invasion easier and cheaper for the Kremlin leader if he needs to use military force, but they could eliminate his need to invade.

That could happen if Ukrainians lose heart and conclude on their own that they have no choice but to submit without the use of force or if the West pushes Kyiv to make ever greater concessions to Moscow in the name of a peace process intended not to reverse Putin’s aggression but rather to find a settlement that will allow the West and Moscow to resume business as usual.

Both Ukrainians and the West need to understand what Putin is about. He is an aggressor, and his aggression must be reversed rather than accommodated. He has already invaded Ukraine and seized territory, and both Ukrainians and the West need to recognize those realities and begin the hard process of reversing Putin’s crimes and punishing him for them.

That will not be easy for either Ukrainians who are forced to look down the barrel of Russian guns and at the pipeline of Russian gas, and it will not be easy for the West which in its desire to declare victory and do business has consistently refused to recognize just how horrific the Soviet system was and how much Putin embodies its worst features.

But it can be done. And three steps are necessary immediately. First, Ukraine and the West must understand what Putin is doing and call it by its rightful names: invasion, Anschluss, provocation, intimidation, and panic-sowing. And both must understand that this is part of a single policy rather than a set of alternatives as some in both Kyiv and the West appear to want to believe.

Second, the West must declare formally a non-recognition policy relative to Crimea and the southeastern portions of Ukraine where Moscow forces are currently operating. Western governments must say clearly that they will never recognize as legitimate the Russian occupation and annexation and that they will never recognize the government that does those things as legitimate either.

That won’t reverse Putin’s crimes immediately, just as the US-led non-recognition policy about the Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania took 50 years to achieve its goal; but it will serve notice to Russia and the world that the results of Putin’s actions will be reversed eventually.

And third, it is long past time to be talking about whether NATO countries should be supplying Ukraine with weapons. They should have been sent at the time of the first Putin moves against Ukraine, and the flow of such weapons and related assistance should have been stepped up with each new Putin action.

In short, the time has come for the West to extend NATO membership to Ukraine, a country that has made the choice to be part of the West and that the West now acknowledges that reality. That alone will not solve the current crisis, but it will disrupt Putin’s strategy and cause both him and his supporters to realize that his approach won’t be tolerated any longer.

If that message isn’t delivered now, Putin will repeat his strategy not only in Ukraine but elsewhere as well.

Summary

With Turkey and Russia now at odds, Central Asia’s prevailing attitude toward Turkey has changed in recent months. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was scheduled to visit Turkmenistan in October, but a terrorist attack in the Turkish capital led him to delay his trip. Since then, Turkey downed a Russian fighter jet near the Turkey-Syria border, and the resulting tension led to a series of trade spats between Moscow and Ankara. These circumstances will change the atmosphere of Erdogan’s Dec. 11 to Dec. 12 visit to Turkmenistan, during which he will meet President Gurbanguly Berdimukhammedov.

Analysis

Turkey has had a hot and cold relationship with the Central Asian states. Although Turkey shares ethnic and linguistic roots with four of the five Central Asian states, they have been wary of Ankara’s attempt to extend its influence into the region. Each state has closed Turkish-sponsored schools and nongovernmental organizations that operated in their countries. Turkmenistan, which is arguably the most neutral and paranoid of the Central Asian states, led the regional crackdowns on Turkish influence starting in 2011.

But Turkey remains crucial for Turkmenistan. Turkey is Turkmenistan’s top import partner; Turkish goods — mostly electronic equipment, machinery, processed metals and furniture — make up 26 percent of Turkmenistan’s imports. Since Russia and Turkey’s most recent spat began, some of this trade has been disrupted. A Stratfor source has indicated that trucks of goods from Turkey meant for Central Asia have been prevented from transiting Russia. During the past week, more Turkish goods that once crossed Russian territory have been moved to a route that goes through Azerbaijan and across the Caspian Sea to Central Asia.

Turkmenistan’s vast energy resources are more important, however, in Turkish-Turkmen relations. The Central Asian country holds the world’s fourth- or fifth-largest natural gas reserves (estimates vary). Turkmenistan currently produces some 83 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas per year and exports 58 percent of that, almost entirely to China. Turkmenistan has the potential to produce even more natural gas, but its location has made it difficult to connect with customers.

One of the most eager potential customers is Turkey, which is working within a consortium to construct the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey, where it will connect with the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, which will carry natural gas onward to Europe. However, Azerbaijan can fill only a portion of the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline’s 16-bcm capacity, leaving room for another supplier. Turkey, Europe and Azerbaijan have long courted Turkmenistan to fill that role through the proposed Trans-Caspian pipeline. All of these pipelines are the cornerstones of the European Union and Turkey’s Southern Corridor energy strategy, meant to transport natural gas from the Caspian area to Europe, bypassing Russian territory and natural gas supplies.

But Turkmenistan has been wary of partaking in a project that counters Russia, which holds a great deal of influence in Turkmenistan and elsewhere in Central Asia. Moreover, Turkmenistan has been more focused in recent years in fulfilling its natural gas contracts with China. But even as Turkmen natural gas exports to China rise, reaching an expected 45 bcm this year, Ashgabat is looking to diversify its exports, especially because Russia is building a natural gas route to China that could rival Turkmenistan’s. Ashgabat is flirting with the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, which is fraught with security and financial concerns. Turkmenistan is also holding more discussions with Tehran about using Iran as a transit partner, but Iran is a strong natural gas producer itself and is not likely to help the competition. This leaves the Trans-Caspian pipeline as the last option for diversifying Turkmenistan’s customer base.

Turkey has also grown more interested in the Trans-Caspian because the proposed TurkStream project, which would carry natural gas supplies from Russia, is likely frozen because of the fallout over the Russian fighter jet incident. As the competition between Turkey and Russia grows in a number of areas, Ankara will not want to increase its already considerable energy dependence on Moscow. Pressing Turkmenistan to finally agree to participate in the Trans-Caspian project has become a higher priority for Turkey.

However, Turkmenistan will strive to keep out of the intensifying Turkish-Russian row. Erdogan may feel he can use his strong connections with Turkmenistan’s elite business circles and government officials, but according to a Stratfor source, the current Turkmen president has taken away some of the business groups’ influence and has set up a system of governance that relies more on his decisions than on lobbying from special interests. Ashgabat will remain cautious in any deal that could worsen its position with Russia, even if the deal could bring economic and financial gain.